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WANG Bei

The Rise and Fall of Social Networking Sites: A Comparative Study of Cyworld and Facebook

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This study examines why some social networking sites (SNSs) stagnate while other SNSs grow by comparing Cyworld with Facebook. Cyworld was one of the most successful SNSs in the world, but its international expansion efforts failed. Facebook's open technology has had considerable influence on various sectors of the economy and society and allowed it to become a dominant SNS at the global level, whereas Cyworld has remained a local SNS. Facebook's open platform and application programming interface (API) pose a serious challenge to Cyworld's walled-garden approach. Cyworld is based on strong ties fostering close relationships, whereas Facebook expands social networks through its open and weak ties and has more network power than Cyworld. Therefore, openness is the main reason behind the rise of Facebook and the fall of Cyworld.

Keywords: social networking site (SNS), Cyworld, Facebook, socio-technical framework, openness

Introduction

Recent trends in web use show a shift from web searches to social networking. The swift expansion of social networking sites (SNSs) has had considerable influence on information distribution and communication. Global SNSs such as Facebook and Twitter as well as regional ones such as Cyworld have grown rapidly. In addition, a wide range of SNSs offer various technological innovations, facilitating diverse interests, and practices (Boyd & Ellison, 2008).

SNSs are defined in many ways, including websites that enable the development of online social relationships by facilitating the collection and sharing of useful information among specific or nonspecific users (Kwon & Wen, 2010). A number of SNSs (e.g., Facebook, Myspace, Hi5, and Cyworld) allow their users to join or create groups so that they can interact with other users with similar interests.

Traditional SNSs focus on personal ties such as relationships between friends, family members, and coworkers, but recent changes tend to focus more on online communities and computer-mediated communications. Therefore, diverse types of SNSs exist.

Papacharissi (2009) classified SNSs into three categories based on the type of membership: social, professional, and exclusive. Facebook, as the representative SNS for socializing, has an open membership system. Professional SNSs refer to business networks such as LinkedIn. To be a LinkedIn member, applicants

are required to be a professional, and therefore the member's job description can be considered the most important piece of information on their profile. Further, the site's exclusive services include a small-world function that allows membership only by invitation (i.e., an invitation by an existing member is required). Such differences in membership qualifications can lead to distinctive profile structures and content.

In addition, media-sharing sites such as YouTube and Flickr focus on the sharing of videos and photos, and as a result, online video media has merged with SNSs.

SNSs are offered in a wide range of languages and show diverse characteristics. Local SNSs (e.g., Cyworld in Korea, Mixi in Japan, Tencent Qzone in China, and VK.com in Russia) have been shown to have considerable influence on communities at the local and national levels. Global and local SNSs compete fiercely in countries where local SNSs dominate the market.

In Korea, Cyworld has dominated the market since its launch in 1999. After its massive success in the local market, Cyworld attempted to offer its services in overseas markets even before Facebook. In reality, however, it has been relegated to the local market (i.e., Korea), whereas Facebook has succeeded in its global expansion efforts. Even in Korea, Facebook is currently growing faster than Cyworld.

What can account for these results? How have such differences influenced these two SNSs? Although these questions address the important issue of differences in forms of online communication, few studies have provided a comparative analysis of the two SNSs.¹ In this regard, this study provides a better understanding of the future of SNSs by considering Cyworld (a representative local SNS) and Facebook (a representative global SNS).

Cyworld and Facebook

Cyworld is an SNS that allows users to create their own home page that can accommodate an unlimited number of photos, documents, and other forms of content. Cyworld is a popular SNS. It had approximately 25 million users in Korea as of December 2013.² As much as 90% of Koreans in their twenties use it for socialization and self-presentation (Shin & Kim, 2008).

Cyworld (launched in 1999) predates many of the leading SNSs based in the US, including MySpace and Facebook (Kim & Yun, 2008). Although the service itself is free, users must pay real money to add certain features to their home page, such as a digital sofa or a TV set. Users exchange cash for a digital currency called *dotori*, which is the Korean word for acorns. One *dotori* can be purchased for approximately 10 US cents.

Cyworld provides the so-called "mini-hompy", a feature referring to the terms "mini" and "home page." On mini-hompies, users can post, update, and maintain bulletin boards, diaries, photos, messages, and other information. Each mini-hompy contains a three-dimensional "room" that users can decorate with digital furniture, artworks, TVs, and music. Instant messaging is provided so that users can chat with visitors (Jung et al., 2007).

After achieving immense popularity in Korea, Cyworld attempted to expand its services overseas, launching sites in the US, China, Japan, Taiwan, and other countries (Kang et al., 2009). Since then, it has faced intense competition. In the US, Cyworld competed with MySpace, Facebook, Friendster, and other SNSs. Although Cyworld has been successful in Korea, it has performed poorly in other countries. In 2009, Cyworld withdrew from Europe, followed by Hong Kong in 2009 and Japan, Taiwan, and the US in 2010. As of

¹ Takahashi (2010) compared MySpace with Mixi in the Japanese context. Ching et al. (2008) compared MySpace with Cyworld.

² Korea's population stands at approximately 50 million.

December 2012, Cyworld maintained its presence in only two overseas markets: Vietnam and China. Cyworld has failed to be a global SNS.

However, Facebook focuses on fostering relationships between friends, family members, and business associates. Facebook, launched in February 2004, was initially an exclusive social network for students at Harvard University, but since then, it has quickly gained popularity among users worldwide. Facebook is a free membership-based site for maintaining user profiles, communicating with other users, uploading pictures, and sharing blog feeds.

As of December 2012, Facebook was the world's largest SNS, boasting 1.5 billion active users (Socialbakers.com, 2012). It has users in 212 countries, and the number of users in non-English-speaking regions (e.g., Europe, Russia, and South America) has increased sharply. Table 1 shows the top five countries in terms of the number of Facebook users as of December 2012. The US (167 million) ranked first, followed by Brazil (65 million), India (62 million), Indonesia (50 million), and Mexico (39 million). Korea (10 million), although its use of Facebook has been growing, ranked only 25th (Socialbaker, 2012).

Table 1

Top Five Countries on Facebook (as of December 2012)

Rank	Country	Users
1	United States	167, 431, 700
2	Brazil	65, 237, 180
3	India	62, 761, 420
4	Indonesia	50, 583, 320
5	Mexico	39, 875, 860
..25	South Korea	9, 885, 540

Note. Source: Socialbaker (December, 2012).

Facebook is tightly integrated into a user's daily media activity. For example, on average, Facebook users spend more than 55 minutes per day using the site, and 50% of active users log on to Facebook at least once a day (Socialbaker, 2012).

Social, Technical, and Business Perspective

The present study assumes that an SNS is a socio-technical product. That is, the study assumes that the adoption and use of SNSs can be interpreted from a sociotechnical perspective. The socio-technical framework reflects a comprehensive approach that considers diverse human and social factors as well as various technological factors in applying new technologies and new media (Sawyer et al., 2003; Shin, 2010).

The term "socio-technical" refers to the interrelatedness of the "social" and "technical" aspects of an organization or social structure (Boyd, 2008). The socio-technical perspective approaches the organization as a social system focusing on interactions between people, organizations, and technological systems (Trist, 1981; Dalpiaz et al., 2011).

The socio-technical approach has initially dealt with interactions between people and technologies in the workplace, but the contemporary socio-technical approach expands the scope of research from micro systems (workplace) to macro ones (the information, communication technology [ICT] industry in general). The ICT ecosystem is complex and composed of deeply interdependent and interrelated social and technological elements, and here changes in one aspect affect others (Wears & Berg, 2005). Instead of viewing the ICT

system as an isolated one within its environment, the approach sees it as a dynamic element of the holistic system that is constantly cooperating and actively interacting with others (Wears & Berg, 2005).

As a result, several studies have adopted socio-technical approaches to explain dynamic ICT phenomena. Among them, some have viewed SNSs as social systems or organizations (Whitworth, 2009; Eason, 2009; Khan, 2012; Steinfield, 2009). In particular, web-based social platforms like Facebook have been considered to provide a foundation for socio-technical systems facilitating interactions among people.

SNSs are virtual organizations or communities in which social interactions are mediated by IT (Whitworth, 2006).³ Eason (2009) argued that because computers are now a major means of communication between people, these developments can be classed as new forms of socio-technical systems in which virtual social systems are dependent on and mediated by the Internet. Khan (2012) suggested that systems based on social media are an emerging area of IS research, design, and practices shaped by the social media phenomenon. These systems apply a wide range of social software and social media phenomena in organizational as well as non-organizational contexts to facilitate everyday interactions.

From this perspective, the present study includes a business factor to provide a more in-depth analysis of SNSs. More specifically, the study provides comparisons at social, technological, and business levels. Among these three factors, technological features have considerable influence on social and business factors. Firstly, the technological-level comparison addresses the level of technology acceptance. In particular, determining whether an SNS accepts Web 2.0 technologies can provide a better understanding of its technological aspects. Secondly, the business-level comparison considers corporate strategies and business models. Thirdly, the study provides a social-level comparison of social networks and cultural factors, which reflect mainly social relationships. The study addresses these relationships by classifying them into strong and weak ties. In particular, the study focuses on the SNS platform by considering its degree of openness.




Figure 1. Framework of social networking site analysis.

This comparative study focuses mainly on determining how various differences between SNSs as socio-technical systems have led to mixed results. Building on previous studies of SNSs, the present study

³ The infrastructure of a virtual organization is its technology, but the overall system is personal and social. This suggests that computer-mediated communities operate by the same principles as physical communities. That is, a virtual society is still a society (Whitworth, 2006).

examines how the differences in social, technological, and business factors between Facebook and Cyworld influenced their performance at the local and global levels.

Based on that research, this study addresses the question of why Cyworld has not taken off as a global SNS, while Facebook has succeeded.

Technical-level Comparison of Web Technology

It is well known that SNSs make use of Web 2.0 technologies (Fu et al., 2007; Shin & Kim, 2008; Brussee & Hekman, 2009; Banbersta, 2010). Previous studies have suggested that SNSs are Web 2.0 applications that facilitate interactive and two-way communication between users. In particular, Web 2.0 technologies allow users to create and share content by collaborating and communicating with one another in online communities. Therefore, it provides users with customized tools for their online activity (Razmerita, 2009).

However, not all SNSs are based on Web 2.0. Websites such as Geocities are not considered as Web 2.0 applications or services in that they have static pages and scheduled updates that are delivered uniformly to all users. These Web 1.0 sites provide content produced exclusively by the publisher (not the user), and therefore users are limited to passively viewing such content (Gulati, 2011). In Web 1.0, there is little need for different websites to communicate with one another and share data.

Web 2.0 is qualitatively different from previous web technologies.⁴ Web 2.0 sites focus on producing dynamic user-generated content that is constantly updated by users (a “push” system). By contrast, Web 1.0 sites allow users access to specific sites to check updated content (a “pull” system).

Despite these differences, few studies have addressed differences between SNSs from the perspective of the ongoing evolution of the Web. Some distinctive features characterize SNSs based on Web 2.0 technologies.

One of the most important features is the idea of the Web as a platform. In the era of Web 2.0, the Web has become a genuine platform fostering the emergence of countless forms of business enterprises, technologies, and ideologies. Many scholars have argued that the concept of the Web as a platform is a turning point differentiating Web 1.0 from Web 2.0 (O’ Reilly, 2005; Naik & Shivalingaiah, 2008; Godwin, 2009).

Another important feature is that users are now playing a central role in product and service innovation, resulting in a shift in the market paradigm. Under Web 1.0, a relatively small number of publishers produce and provide content, and a vast majority of users are passive consumers of content. However, under Web 2.0, any user can create content by employing a wide range of applications for content creation (Cormode & Krishnamurthy, 2008). Web 2.0 also provides the necessary infrastructure and applications for more dynamic participation by users, facilitating their social interaction and collaboration and fostering their collective intelligence.

In the new participatory Web, sharing data between sites is an essential capability, and users can be much more interactive. In addition, such changes have intensified with the advent of mobile broadband. With the integration of personalization and mobility (the key advantages of the mobile Internet) into the existing wired Internet, it has become easier for firms to determine their users’ needs and offer a wide range of customized services. In addition, mobile broadband provides users with the freedom to access content anytime, anywhere, and therefore it can enhance cross-device connectivity.

As a result, the combination of “connected” mobile broadband and SNSs has had considerable influence on the popularity and success of SNSs because they allow for ubiquitous and universal access to information

⁴ Web 1.0 is about the client-server relationship, whereas Web 2.0 is about peer-to-peer networks. Web 2.0 is basically about users, not webmasters, producing website content.

and services as well as the unique and personalized exchange of information (Weiser, 1991).⁵

One of the key technological features that differentiate Facebook from Cyworld is Facebook's acceptance of Web 2.0 technology. Facebook reflects a successful application of Web 2.0 technology. Facebook has a number of features that make it unique and keep users updated on their social relationships.

One such feature is its Newsfeed system, a bulletin board on users' home pages that automatically updates to show their friends' activities. Therefore, each time a user logs on to Facebook, he or she obtains the latest information on his or her friends. Users simply check the Newsfeed system to see what their friends have been up to. They are interested mainly in the activities of their friends (Munitzk, 2010). Newsfeed, which Facebook introduced in 2006, is convenient and addictive and is widely found on today's SNSs.

The Newsfeed system consists of a number of protocols. The really simple syndication (RSS) feature is one of the protocols belonging to Newsfeed. An RSS feed is one of the best ways to promote content on the Web as well as on Facebook. Most websites have at least one RSS feed to help "push" their content to their readers.

In addition to Newsfeed, Facebook provides its users with a wide range of interactive features, including the Wall, an area on the profile page. The Wall is a type of messaging system in which friends leave comments for the owner of the profile page that can be viewed by other users (Valenzuela et al., 2008).⁶

Cyworld has become the most popular SNS among technology-savvy young Koreans because of the country's well-developed broadband network. However, Cyworld has failed to further expand its service because of its passive approach to Web 2.0 technology. Although Cyworld has been classified as a Web 2.0 application by some scholars (Shin & Kim, 2008), it is not a Web 2.0 application in the truest sense. Cyworld introduced a news feed system, but it was only after Facebook and Twitter applied it approximately four years earlier.

While the ease with which Facebook can be integrated with other services for various purposes has made Facebook successful during its growth phase. The Facebook Connect feature (launched in December 2008) is an example. With Facebook Connect, users can use their Facebook identity on other websites. This means that they can use only one password for multiple websites. Dougherty (2009) argued that it has the advantage of allowing users to share stories in their news feed and make comments on websites and blogs. In 2010, more than 60 million Facebook users per month made use of Facebook Connect for other websites. Further, more than 80,000 websites use Facebook Connect. As shown in Figure 2, with the introduction of open APIs such as Facebook Connect, Facebook has experienced rapid growth (Dougherty, 2009).

However, the proliferation of smart phones and the availability of increasingly affordable wireless broadband have been the key driving forces behind Facebook's massive global membership. In contrast to Cyworld, Facebook has long allowed users to access the site using mobile platforms, increasing the accessibility of Facebook. Mobile applications provided by the iPhone and BlackBerry for accessing Facebook anywhere have contributed to the site's growth. As of September 2012, 60% of all Facebook users accessed the

⁵ It was not until the iPhone was introduced that Web 2.0 services such as blogs and SNSs gained popularity. Before the iPhone, the use of Web 2.0 services in the mobile environment was limited in terms of the speed of communications networks and the availability of applications. Since 2009, 3G mobile broadband has increased the speed of communications networks, allowing Web 2.0 services to be provided readily through the mobile environment and serving as a catalyst for mobile Web 2.0. Users download SNS applications from the App Store and enjoy SNSs on a real-time basis (Nomura Research Institute, 2006).

⁶ Poke is another feature with which users can send a virtual poke to other users. A poke is a notification feature that tells the user that he or she has been contacted and originates from Internet Relay Chat customs in the early, text-only years of the Internet.

site using mobile devices (insidefacebook.com, 2012).

Cyworld belatedly introduced mobile services, but their technological features failed to attract users. Most importantly, the iPhone's belated debut in Korea has had considerable influence on Cyworld use. Facebook was quick to let its users access the site through the iPhone and has constantly upgraded its user interface, whereas Cyworld has maintained its old-fashioned mobile interface (Lee, 2011). Cyworld has struggled to leverage its desktop dominance in the mobile realm. Only 5.4% of mobile users in 2009 used mobile SNSs. In addition, only 20% of smartphone users used Cyworld as of May 2011, whereas 33% of conventional phone users did (Seong et al., 2011).




Figure 2. Market share of visits within social networking category of Facebook. Source: Dougherty (2009) based on Hitwise Intelligence Data.




Figure 3. Total and mobile traffic trend of Facebook. Source: <http://www.socialbakers.com> (2013).

Cyworld has lagged behind Facebook in terms of the level of technology acceptance. Cyworld has maintained passive attitudes not only toward Web 2.0 technology but also toward smart phones. Although these differences may not have played a critical role in some areas, they have had considerable influence on their

corporate performance.

Business-level Comparison of Openness

Web 2.0 is not only about the evolutionary aspects of the Web but also about the social and business use of advanced web technologies. The ability to produce and share content on Web 2.0 sites has completely transformed the ways in which firms conduct business, including the planning, production, and distribution of services.

In this sense, SNSs can be regarded as business platforms through which third parties provide applications for accessing content on SNSs. O'Reilly (2005) argued that firms must treat the Web as a strategic platform for the innovation, production, and delivery of services and products.

One of the main drivers of the wide acceptance of the SNS platform is its openness. Brusse and Hekman (2009) claimed that SNSs represent a highly-accessible business platform that makes it easier for users and developers to participate in various online activities. In this regard, the active SNS adoption of an open platform ideal becomes a critical success factor. Moving away from "walled gardens" to a more open platform has become not an option but an indispensable trend, and this has widened the business scope and facilitated a sustainable business model.

Driven by Facebook, a recent trend views Web 2.0 as a platform supporting diverse applications. This is enabled by the open API, which allows users to add applications to their accounts and share content through such applications (Cormode & Krishnamurthy, 2008).

In this sense, open collaboration has become another market norm and a key word for achieving success in the new era of business on the Web. In this regard, various actors have emerged as leaders shaping this open ecosystem.⁷

In any case, the principle of platform openness also applies to mobile devices and broadband. In fact, one of the key success factors for SNSs comes from the evolution and openness of the mobile ecosystem. The introduction of smartphones and the availability of the 3G technology have driven changes in the business model of mobile services in recent years (ACMA, 2011). Feijoo et al. (2009) argued that users engage in mobile social networking when the mobile ecosystem reaches a turning point in its evolution. The recent availability of mobile broadband connections, their increasing affordability, and the usability of new mobile devices such as smartphones indicate that the necessary conditions have been met for a critical mass of users to make wide use of advanced mobile services.

This study addresses the platform from a business perspective because the platform is closely related to corporate strategies and business models. In terms of the openness of the platform, no site can compete with Facebook (AppLeap & Great Wall Club, 2010). Facebook provides an open platform that allows easy access and adapts itself to the needs of users and developers. Facebook has more than one million developers and entrepreneurs from over 180 countries. As of 2010, it had more than 500,000 active applications (www.facebook.com). Because third-party applications are hosted on their own servers, there is a continuously growing pool of applications available for Facebook users. In addition, the expansion and maintenance of

⁷ For instance, Apple's revenue-sharing arrangements with developers have been the key driver of the success of the Apple ecosystem. Apple has reshaped its revenue model by providing a 70/30 revenue split in favor of developers and excluding network operators from revenue-sharing arrangements for mobile applications. This has attracted large numbers of new developers to its App Store, and the revenue model has become the de facto revenue-sharing standard in the mobile application business (ACMA, 2011).

Facebook applications are almost autonomous, which provides users and developers with many opportunities and advantages.

Further, Facebook's open architecture allows existing web enterprises to plug directly into their social infrastructure with their own Facebook applications (Ching et al., 2008). Facebook opened its API to anyone interested in developing applications, establishing an open SNS ecosystem. The open API lets anyone integrate its service with Facebook by tapping into Facebook's database and creating applications that can then be added to the system and adopted by users.

In contrast to Facebook, other SNSs have typically kept their platforms closed to third-party application development. Cyworld has maintained a walled-garden model, making its platform relatively closed to modifications and third-party functionalities. Unlike Facebook, Cyworld does not have a platform for third-party applications. It considers its platform as other mini-hompies, not as a true platform. Although Cyworld adopted an open API in 2009, it has prevented users from transferring content to other sites, allowing only inbound content.

In 2010, Facebook introduced the Social Plug-In feature as part of the "Open Graph" strategy. This feature makes a user's webpage equivalent to a Facebook page. This version of the Facebook platform puts people at the center of the Web and lets users shape their experiences online, inducing them to become more social. One example is the new "like" button on websites, which lets a user share pages from a website on his or her Facebook profile with only one click.

Finally, Facebook and Cyworld follow different business models. Facebook has an advertising model featuring social ads that ensure targeted advertising and allow firms to engage in viral marketing (Leong, 2010). Under this model, third-party developers are allowed to update user data and operate their applications on Facebook. In addition, they can establish their own advertising platforms and engage in advertising on Facebook independently.




Figure 4. Revenue of Facebook 2009-2012. Source: <http://www.socialbakers.com> (2013).

Unlike Facebook, Cyworld has a business model based not on advertising but on digital goods. Cyworld

maintains its profit model because users do not want to see advertising on their mini-hompies. Therefore, Cyworld generates most of their revenue from digital goods,⁸ including background music, avatars, and casual games.

Simply put, Cyworld can be described not as a platform but as an online extension of the real world that allows users to share their photos, activities, and interests with their close friends in a closed and interconnected space. This reality acts as a huge barrier for Cyworld in expanding its business.

Social-level Comparison of Social Networks and Cultural Ties

People have traditionally maintained social networks such as blood ties, regional ties, and school ties. In addition, individuals sometimes form networks based on specific interests. Such social networks may appear disorderly, but they are based on certain principles. Barabasi and Albert (1999) explained that many large networks share common characteristics, because such networks expand continuously through the addition of new vertices, and these vertices preferentially attach to sites that are already well connected. Since the introduction of the Web, online cafes and blogs have been used as alternative networks. In the early stages, internet-based networks tended to be based on offline relationships.

However, SNSs have the unlimited ability to expand social networks. People have both strong and weak ties to others. Individuals with strong ties tend to have similar backgrounds and lifestyles. However, weak ties can lead to alienation but can also be indispensable to individuals' opportunities and their integration into communities. Weak ties can also be seen as more effective in bridging social distance (Granovetter, 1973). Because weakly tied communicators are not likely to be motivated to interact with one another and do not communicate frequently enough to establish their own group-wide patterns of behavior, the medium that serves to connect them is likely to be strengthened by others. SNSs strengthen ties between users and facilitate communication among those with weak ties, strengthening their ties and expanding their networks.

Previous studies have examined the role of cultural differences in communication by considering various cultural dimensions, particularly individualism and collectivism (Hofstede, 1984, Moon & Franke, 2000). Collectivist cultures, which are characterized by family integrity, in-group membership, and strong solidarity, place considerable emphasis on interdependence. By contrast, individuals in individualist cultures value self-reliance, competition, and hedonism, shun in-groups and tend to consider themselves to be more independent (Triandis, 1989). Asian societies such as China and Korea (which observe the Confucian tradition) exhibit high levels of collectivism, whereas Western societies such as the US tend to emphasize individualism (Hofstede, 1984).

Chau et al. (2002) examined internet users in the US and Hong Kong and reported that those in Hong Kong (a collectivist culture) tended to view the Internet as a means of social interaction, whereas those in the US (an individualist culture) were more likely to use the Internet as a device for obtaining information. This cultural difference in building and managing social relationships may also differentiate how individuals perceive and use SNSs.

Cyworld is based on strong ties, as indicated by "ilchon" relationships ("friends" in Korean). Cyworld users cultivate online and offline relationships by forming ilchon relationships with one another through personalized home pages called mini-hompies. A user can link his or her mini-hompy to another user's

⁸ Cyworld, which developed a virtual-currency model, is the first company to generate revenues from the sale of virtual goods (approximately 80% of its revenues came from virtual goods as of 2010). The term "dotori" ("acorns" in Korean) allegedly refers to the Cyworld founder's nickname.

mini-hompy to form a friend relationship. In this way, ilchon turns offline networks into online ones.

However, Facebook is based on weak ties. Facebook users reveal their personal interests and information and can easily access information on other users. Users can form relationships with strangers, celebrities, and even politicians. This type of weak-tie communication entails considerable network power.

There are also differences between the two sites in terms of the strength of social networks. The two sites facilitate preexisting social relationships. Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe (2007) suggested that Cyworld is used to maintain existing offline relationships or solidify offline connections, not to make new friends. Cyworld strengthens social networks but is limited to facilitating relationships that are already close. Those users wanting to form online relationships based on their existing offline relationships (e.g., blood ties, regional ties, and school ties) have made successful use of Cyworld.

By contrast, Facebook expands social networks by enabling open collaboration. Users make use of Facebook as an open plaza where users can share opinions, photos, videos, and other information to communicate with other users.

These different characteristics are reflected in cultural aspects. According to Chau et al. (2002), individualism and collectivism are particularly relevant dimensions in studying the use of services built around Web 2.0, including SNSs. Hofstede (2001) articulated that individualism is represented by autonomous and independent individuals who are more or less detached from a group. Individual goals and needs commonly take priority over group goals and needs. By contrast, collectivism is defined as individuals' focus on group interdependence and cohesiveness. In a collectivist culture, individual goals and needs are likely to be subservient to or indistinguishable from group goals and needs.

Cyworld is based on Korean culture, which reflects collectivism. Cyworld users are more likely to be involved in group activities than individual ones and tend to be less sociable and hesitant about accepting newcomers. Cyworld's ilchon system virtually extends the concept of Korean culture based on blood ties. Blood ties protect a sense of solidarity among those who share the same family roots and represent Koreans' passive attitudes toward relationship processes that occur as relationships are formed, maintained, and terminated, that is, attitudes based on some prevailing predetermination (Kim & Yun, 2008).

By contrast, Facebook is based on an individualist culture. Facebook users tend to have more open attitudes toward newcomers. Facebook is outward-looking, aggressive, and open, whereas Cyworld is inward-looking and family- and group-oriented.

Cyworld and Facebook interpret the concept of friends differently. Members of collectivistic cultures require their friendships to be based on long-term relationships and are concerned with the welfare of others, whereas those of individualistic cultures willingly allow new people to be friends (Cho, 2010). Korean users prefer small community-based group relationships. This suggests that members of collectivist cultures are more likely to maintain closed and narrow in-group relationships than those of individualistic cultures, who are more likely to create new relationships (Triandis, 1989).

Noteworthy is that in China, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam, local SNSs have more members than Facebook. These countries all have collectivist cultures based on Confucian ideals.⁹

⁹ Government regulations also influence SNS performance. In China and Vietnam, state authorities are very strict in terms of granting licenses to foreign SNS firms.

Table 2

SNS Subscription Ranking in South Korea, China, Japan, and Vietnam

Rank	South Korea	China	Japan	Vietnam
1	Cyworld	Tencent Qzone	Twitter	ZingMe
2	Me2day	Sina Weibo	Mixi	Do.vn
3	Facebook	RenRen	Facebook	Facebook

Note. Source: comScore, March 2012 and paidContent May 2012.

In addition, Facebook users are more interested in staying connected to their friends and acquaintances, whereas Cyworld users expect more intense interactions with SNS friends. Ellison et al. (2007) demonstrated that Facebook users are more interested in bridging social capital (which is associated with maintaining existing relationships on a broad and economic basis), not in bonding social capital (which refers to intensifying established relationships). Kim and Yun (2008) found that users strengthen only their existing social bonds through Cyworld.

When Cyworld extended its service to other countries, it applied the Korean model to each country. Cyworld prioritized cultural factors and attempted to build a locally customized network based on each country's culture. As a result, Cyworld had different versions of its platform that were not compatible with one another. Eventually, this strategy created a high barrier in every market, hindering network communication at the global level.

Cyworld and Facebook users show different communication styles. Facebook users post basic information on their identity, omitting personal emotions. Cyworld users prefer non-text information (e.g., profile images that are unique but unidentifiable) to express themselves.

Accordingly, the two sites' membership systems closely reflect cultural differences. Cyworld requires applicants to register their social security number and home address, whereas Facebook does not. Facebook's registration process is simple in that it asks only for the user's email address. In addition, regional SNSs face language barriers in expanding their services overseas.

Therefore, Cyworld's closed networks have served as a barrier to the development of global social networks. That is, such networks do not satisfy the user's need to publicly communicate with strangers. In addition, they cannot facilitate global networks. Therefore, it is difficult to form relationships with foreign users through Cyworld.

The use of Cyworld has declined steadily, although it has facilitated strong networks based on offline relationships. Cyworld's ilchon system is limited to a role as a bridge between online and offline networks, and Cyworld has some major limitations as an open SNS.

By contrast, Facebook has been successful in its international expansion efforts. It has adopted global trends toward the open sharing and consumption of communication and information. Even Korea SNS users have shifted from Cyworld to Facebook.

Conclusion

SNSs have expanded rapidly in recent years both locally and globally. Because Facebook has become a global SNS, it has been competing with local SNSs, including Korea's Cyworld. Cyworld and Facebook show important differences in their development paths, which have led to Cyworld's failure and Facebook's success in the global SNS arena.

This study addresses the differences between Cyworld and Facebook in terms of their technologies. Cyworld emphasizes closeness, whereas Facebook emphasizes openness. Cyworld has shown passive attitudes toward the adoption of Web 2.0 technologies, whereas Facebook has made active use of it. In addition to its Newsfeed, Facebook offers a number of features that allow users to interact with one another. Although Cyworld was launched four years before Facebook, the former lagged behind the latter in terms of enabling users to access the site through smartphones.

In terms of their business models, Cyworld emphasizes revenues from the decoration of mini-hompies, and thus pays close attention to its in-house mall, which sells a wide range of virtual items for decoration. It does not have a platform for third-party applications, whereas Facebook has an effective one. By contrast, Facebook has an open platform that allows everyone to easily access the site and adapts itself to the needs of users and developers. Facebook opened its API to anyone interested in developing applications, establishing an open SNS ecosystem.

Technological features also influence social networks and cultural factors. The results indicate that Cyworld is based on strong ties, whereas Facebook, on weak ties. However, Facebook's communication system, which is based on weak ties, has more network power than that of Cyworld, which is based on strong ties.

Cyworld and Facebook show some important differences in terms of the strength of social networks. Although both make use of existing offline relationships, Cyworld strengthens them by fostering only close relationships. This closed system has served as a barrier in Cyworld's efforts to expand overseas. By contrast, Facebook expands social networks by providing ample opportunities for open collaboration.

Cyworld reorganized its communication strategy for each country. Its attempt to build a locally customized network based on each country's culture turned out to be an obstacle to its global expansion efforts. Cyworld reflects a collectivist culture. That is, it is inward-looking and family- and group-oriented. By contrast, Facebook is based on an individualist culture. That is, it is outward-looking, aggressive, and open.

Table 3

Comparison of Cyworld and Facebook

Level of analysis	Unit of analysis	Attributes	Cyworld	Facebook
Technical system	Technology acceptance	Web technology	Passive (Web 1.0)	Aggressive (Web 2.0)
		Access (to update)	Visit mini-hompy	Automatic updating
		Smartphone	Passive	Aggressive
Business system	Corporate strategy	Platform strategy	Closed platform	Open platform
		Social collaboration (3rd party developers)	Passive	Aggressive
		Main business model	Item revenue	Advertising
Social system	Social network	Relationship	Strong ties (ilchon)	Weak ties (friend of a friend)
		Expansion of relationship	Barrier to expand	Easy to expand
	Culture	Cultural dimensions	Collectivism	Individualism
		Demographic composition	Mainly under 30s	All aged

Cyworld, launched four years before Facebook, has become successful and popular in Korea. Following its success, Cyworld made efforts to expand overseas to become a leading global SNS. However, the same factors that allowed Cyworld to be successful in the local market have led to its failure in the global market. In hindsight, Cyworld has failed in other countries because its technological, business, and social models did not

reflect the needs of potential users. However, Facebook has been successful because of its openness and focus on weak ties. Cyworld's disadvantage is Korea's relative isolation, whereas Facebook's advantage is its inception at the very center of the global social sphere.

Facebook has been growing faster than Cyworld even in Korea in recent years. Facebook has gradually increased its market share in Korea, whereas Cyworld has been losing it. Although the local SNS has dominated the Korean market for a long time, its position has been threatened by the global SNS.




Figure 5. Cyworld and Facebook in terms of weekly usage rate.

Confronted with the rise of Facebook in Korea, Cyworld has changed its strategy and adopted services styled after Facebook. However, it remains unclear whether the local SNS can overcome the globally competitive SNS.

This study shows that technology, business practices, and social networks are critical factors in determining whether or not the social networking site can extend globally. When an SNS maintains a closed model, it can be successful in the short term at the local market. However, it is difficult to grow, and it could lose its market to strong outsiders. Thus, openness in terms of technology and business and social networks is the main reason behind the rise of Facebook and the fall of Cyworld.

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How Much Digital Activism Plays a Role in Political Activism: A Case Study of Morocco's February 20th Movement

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The present paper seeks to investigate the extent to which digital activism plays a role in political activism in Morocco through the intersection between women and young activists movement and the social media. By doing so, the author argues that while facebook and the Moroccan political arena are Male dominated public areas, young female activists have emerged as prominent leaders in both spaces. The author will more particularly explain why female and youth activists are important in the current state of Moroccan politics. Next, the author provides a discussion of the February 20th Movement, and the movement's utilization of Facebook. It will show that young female activists involved in the February 20th Movement have used Facebook in unique and creative ways to further the Movement.

Keywords: Morocco; digital activism; Facebook; February 20th Movement

Definition of Key Terms

Activism. According to Yachoulti (2012) activism may be defined as the different activities conducted by some active citizens to make other citizens aware that something is going wrong and involves them to seek remedies so as to get things in order. A democratic activism is usually achieved by the citizens themselves, or with the help of the constitutional institutions such as the parliament, legislative assemblies, executive bodies, administration, and the judiciary. Activism can take different forms: While real life activism takes place on the ground, others are invisible. Generally speaking, the main forms of activism include grass root activism, whose main purpose is to increase the popularity and support for a specific social cause. Groups are usually organized in large scale—movement to defend their cause and achieve their goals. With the popularity of social media which continues to grow globally, a new form of activism has brought out among youth and women's political activism that has come to be known as digital activism. This new form of activism, relying on the virtual world, trespasses the cross-national boundaries and allows activists worldwide to communicate and interact in most time very rapidly and efficiently.

Social media. This refers to new forms of communication techniques mostly based on the wide world web or mobile technologies. The aim is to create and exchange information over established networks, unlike mainstream media.

Traditional media/mainstream media. They basically refer to channels that the majority of consumers make recourse to. These include broadcast media such as radio, television, and newspapers.

Social networking site. These refer to social forums on the Internet where users can interact through sharing information with friends, family, and colleagues with whom they have been networked with. Users can post updates, photographs, videos, and links and respond to what others have posted on their profiles.

Democracy. In this form of government, citizens within a country have the rights to make decisions affecting their lives and their country.

Contextualizing the Political Upheavals in Morocco During the Arab Spring

Anyone familiar with Moroccan women and youth's achievements in the last few decades would not be surprised by their active role in "Moroccan Arab Spring". More particularly, women's involvement in political sphere is not a new phenomenon, but it has its origins in the early days of the Moroccan state that dates back to the post-independence era. Since national independence was gained in 1956, females have played a crucial role in political activism, whose main concern is to defend social and political cause of women (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2006). It is at that moment that women's associations and their local political activism started to bridge the gap between women and the Moroccan sphere (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2006, p. 106). Since then, women's participation in political associations represents their attempt to work outside the government with an eye to change it.

As to the youth's from the 1960's till the 1990's involvement in political activism, Moroccan young generation, like women, has always been part of the Moroccan political scene as a whole. In the 1950's and 1960's, the youth have engaged in politics formally or informally through university manifestations and demonstrations backing up a Marxist agenda. However, by the 1980's, the youth diverged to support an Islamic regime (Rahman, 2012). During the last decade, Moroccan youth have been involved in political activism in defense of education reforms, political, economic, and social changes struggling against imperialism, colonialism, and above all supporting the Arab nationalism, viz., the Palestine cause. In brief, youth's activism can be described as shifting from dogmatic, ideological to societal openness and reform (Rahman, 2012). Despite of all their long struggles, Moroccan women and youth were marginalized by their government and have always felt being frustrated due to the system's unresponsiveness.

Despite of the fact that politics has always been considered exclusively as a male-oriented sphere, their influential participation in politics has marked Morocco's history and shaped the structure of society as whole. Within this decade, the Arab world has progressively experienced a revolutionary era of a new form of social media, the usage of the mobile phone, the fast growing rate of internet use, and most actively, social networks. At the national level, the rise of the 20th February Movement witnessed both Moroccan women and youth's using of Facebook in a creative way to further the movement which shows how these two cohorts, who have for long suffered from the government's unresponsiveness and marginalization, have a serious interest in changing the government and power structure as it stands. By choosing hope over fear, optimism over pessimism, activism over apathy, the 20th February Movement brought young women in an unprecedented change in the country.

From an international perspective, the revolutions in both Tunisia and Egypt and their aftermaths have encouraged the Moroccan females and youth to take a step to destroy the walls of fear that have paralyzed them for decades. Popular uprisings, in most parts of the MENA region, call for the end of dictatorship and corruption, more civil rights and freedom of expression, employment, and above all for social justice. These Arab uprisings ended up in different results according to the degrees of dictatorship authoritarianism exerted throughout the various parts of the MENA region (Yachoulti, 2012).

Within this Arab Spring, Morocco has not been an exception. Demonstrations in Morocco emerged from the

incidents already taking place in the MENA region. The flee of the president Ben Ali from Tunisia on January 14th, 2011 had a profound impact on the group as they seized the momentum to bombard the group's page with daring claims addressed to Morocco's king. The Moroccan protesters also asked the king to change the constitution, dissolve the parliament, and put those who steal the public money on trial, among many other demands. Moreover, on January 25th, 2011 when the Egyptian people started gathering in *Tahrir* square, Facebook page administrators in Morocco started to grow in number and take new steps; they developed their organization skills. They started by changing the page name to "freedom and democracy now", and then they published a call for nationwide protests on February 20th.

In simple terms, Moroccan females and youth wanted to take their activism and the action to real-life. A first initiative to found the 20th February Movement group was by creating a Facebook page and launching a video campaign on YouTube to prompt the people to join the movement. Indeed, on February 20, 2011, Moroccans counted by thousands regrouped in Rabat, calling for a constitutional reform with regard to the king's renunciation of some of the power. They did not experience the fear of the years of leading the old generation that is still haunted by. Further, these youngsters and women activists grew with the new king and have witnessed his reforms and have become part of the political expectations. The march found its way to the parliament without getting any kind of resistance from the police. Other numerous protests took place in many cities around the country: Casablanca, Marrakech, Tangier, Fez, etc. Protests were led in peaceful circumstances demanding government change, cease of the system. An estimation report was made by the ministry of interior affairs declaring 37,000 protesters marching in the streets of Morocco on 20th February (Kabbaj, 2013).

On 9th March, the king Mohammed VI declared in a speech to the populace that a new comprehensive constitutional reform attempting to better democracy and justice in the country was to be established. On 20th March, other significant rallies took place in 60 cities across the country demanding for more changes than those announced by the king. In the following days, the number of protesters lowered, and the police seemed to change its peaceful strategy to a severe one by chasing the few remained ones. This incident led to the death of a demonstrator giving place to huge rallies in Rabat and Casablanca on 5th June. Several groupings were pursued in a decremented way, on a weekly basis, every Sunday. Almost one year after the elections, when the Justice and Development party gained the majority of votes and Abdelilah Benkirane was elected as head of the government, new protests were held claiming the government's failure to abide by the reforms.

Generally speaking, the Arab uprisings have been blended with the advent of the digital and technological means of socialization and communication. This decade has been marked by the Arab world's progressive experience with a revolutionary era of a new form of social media. Thus, the usage of the mobile phone, the fast growing rate of internet use and most actively, social networks brings us into the question of whether the role of social media has boosted the rise of the Arab spring. In 2011, the number of Moroccan users of Internet was around 15 million; half of the population current statistics showed that the number of Moroccan users of social networks, primarily Facebook, was around 5.5 million, almost 20% of whom were able to exchange messages and post comments, publish picture and videos and to create groups and event pages. Moreover, YouTube, as a video sharing website, permits its users to watch and share videos initially designed (Rahman, 2012). Most importantly, they are estimated to be more than 35 million mobile phone users in Morocco which represents a 100% mobile penetration, and the sales of smart phones are increasing at a rate of at least 200% yearly with around 600,000 in circulation as of 2011 year end. A report on the use of mobile phones, "Smartphone" type, in Morocco shows that with the progress of technology, Moroccans are willing more and more to invest in sophisticated

mobile technology, and are eager to consume high quality mobile internet content (Rahman, 2012; kabbaj, 2012).

In this paper, the question of whether the use of social media has indeed driven up the Arab spring in Morocco is at the core of the research objectives. More specifically, the study focuses on how women and youth use Facebook in a creative way to further the movement. Both of these cohorts have a serious interest in changing the government and power structure as it stands. By choosing hope over fear, optimism over pessimism, activism over apathy, the February 20th Movement brought young women to the forefront in an unprecedented change in the country (Rahman, 2012). The purpose behind this gender approach is to show the extent to which social media, namely facebook, has improved the quality of political activism and promoted democratization in Morocco, and see whether it is the reason behind the February 20th Movement, or whether it is just a tool. This will be done through the following trajectory. After defining key concepts to this research such as activism, social media and democracy, and providing some basic background information about the political scene in Morocco in the preliminaries section, the paper will start with some general notes on both methodology of data collection and the theoretical approach adopted in this research. Then, it will proceed by briefly tracing the way digitalization improves the quality of activism in the 20th February Movement, and its positive effects on democracy in Morocco. The next step is to discuss the impact of social media on the public space. Finally, this study addresses the substantial role played by Facebook in improving the quality of activism to the old associations' activism in Morocco. Furthermore, this research aims at establishing a discussion on whether social media has succeeded in what mainstream media including television, newspapers have failed to do to be omitted, and briefly shed some light on the activism led by Moroccan women before 2011 and that of 20th February Movement.

Methodology

Research Hypotheses

To achieve the purposes of this research, the author has formulated three hypotheses on the basis of digital activism literature and the previous studies done in different contexts:

Hypothesis 1: Digital activism improves the quality of political activism and Facebook as one of those social media outlets has a positive effect on spreading the culture of democracy in the country;

Hypothesis 2: Social media give much freedom of expression to both women and youth in the public space;

Hypothesis 3: Facebook plays a substantial role in improving the quality of political activism in comparison with the past.

Justifications for the Choice of the Sample

This study adopts a qualitative method of research based on in-depth interviews with 24 young university students whose ages vary between 18 and 30 years old, and they are both females and males. Thirty three point three percent of them are founding members of the February 20th Movement; 33.3% others are sympathizers with the movement, and the other 33.3% informants are showing neutral attitudes towards the movement. The members of the first category all have political affiliation while the other two groups are social activists, members of NGOs, or civil society, but they all belong to no political party. The interviewees are from diverse cities and villages of Morocco: Fez, Meknes, Agouray, Rabat, Sidi Slimane, Tetouane, Beni Mellal, Marrakech, and Oujda. The author carried out the interviews with the first category in a Youth Campus in Fez wherein a large group of young activists are staying on vacation for a couple of weeks during this summer holiday. As to the other two groups, the author met them in a cafe individually, and some of them whom could not be conducted a face to face interview with accepted to respond to the interview questions via e-mail. The author

had a conversations with one of the male founders of the 20th February Movement who has a strong background in human rights advocacy. He is currently a member of the Moroccan Organization of Human Rights in the city of Fez. The author also used several sources including the Face book page of the 20th February Movement and YouTube videos. The choice of the interviewees for this study who are university (under) graduates and Ph.D. candidates is driven by the fact that the transnational space of reference and debate on a number of issues created by the new media is only possible for a population, like students, who have a (relatively) high level of education. Testimonies from this segment of society that has largely contributed to the movement give much credibility to this research. The interviewees identified themselves as movement founders or active members were not afraid of mentioning their names, which reflects the freedom of speech and democracy reached with this new generation of activists unlike in the past when no one dared mention his /her name publicly as being a member of a social/political. Most importantly, they all use Facebook on a daily basis in a space that is, according to them, free of censorship. Besides, they are the ones mostly using social media in their everyday life as well as a substantial means of activism and spreading of democracy in the whole country. The interviews were done in English and Arabic. There were 25 questions. The type of questions asked in these interviews revolved around personal questions (age, gender, occupation...etc.), the extent to which the informants are familiar with the February 20th movement, and the way they have initially known about it (Facebook). In addition to that, the interviewees were also asked about their involvement with politics, or social movements in general. They were also concerned about the social networks and its role to drive democracy in Morocco, and its importance in providing a large space of freedom for women in the public sphere, and their struggle to have their rights and gains on the ground. The last questions focused on a comparison between women's activism within the "past women's associations" and the new forms of activism among young and female digital activists.

Approach

Gender is a social variable that becomes a predominant issue at the digital age, whereby communication and interaction through those technological tools have become increasingly spreading all over the globe. Whether the users are highly educated or have an average standard of education or even are illiterate, they are observed to have shown a relatively equal level of competence among both females and males in their use of cell phones, smart phones, Facebook, You Tube, Internet among many others. These technological devices are actually observed to be used almost in the same way by both females and males. Access to Facebook and other social media outlets has been shown by many researchers to be independent of gender, but it was rather related to education. It is established in Zikuhr and Smith (2012) that women were less likely than men to chat on the web, but were slightly more likely to use e-mails. Furthermore, women utilize different sites than men. Women communicate on the internet differently than men, who are online less than men and utilize different type of websites than men. However, they came to the conclusion that women access the Facebook the same as men. They came to the conclusion that knowledge related to the web use is an independent variable that influences Internet use by women and men. Moreover, Gelber (2011, p. 14) notes that "Theoretically, social media should be an asset for women politicians". whereby women are now outnumbering men on social networking sites. Along the same line, Gelber adds that a report on 2010 campaign indicated that women are almost at parity with men in their use of social media in political purposes. As to Facebook, it is rightly observed that in the American society, women played a key role in the early days by adapting three core activities, posting to walls,

adding photos, and joining groups. Likewise, Carter, Steiner, and McLaughlin (2014) rightly observes that the gender approach to social media:

[fosters] an international dialogue among media and gender researchers and activists will broaden and deepen our understanding in international global and transnational terms . Encouraging more transnational forms of feminist media research is central to challenging rosy views of an ideal post feminist state of being and to critiquing mediated prescriptions for ideal or normative masculine and feminine bodies. (p. 4)

The present investigation is embedded with the conceptual approach adopted by the above scholars.

Analysis and Interpretation

The Influence of the Use of Social Media on Political Activism and Its Effects on Democracy

Concerning the influence of Facebook, YouTube, and other social media outlets on the emergence of the February 20th Movement, it is established by 80% of my interviewees that without the use of Facebook it would not have been possible for the large masses to go out to the street to protest at the same time all over Morocco. The women and youth leaders were initially in Rabat and Casablanca as emphasized by one of the female leaders, but she added that those protesters were communicating with others from the different regions to transform this virtual activism. Although the paper highlights the important role played by the Facebook in the emergence of this movement, and the way the founding and early stages of the movement fits into the overall development of online activism, the author argues that the use of Facebook by those activists complements and does not substitute the necessary component of the ground activism. What makes Facebook most useful in the Moroccan settings as well as all over the globe is presumably the fact that these technologies collapse the barriers to broadcast. That is to say, Facebook breaks the barriers that Moroccan activists face when they want to express their ideas or diffuse information among activists for protests or any other kind of manifestation. To improve political activism on the ground, online activists suggest improving the use of Facebook by selecting the groups and individuals they work with, checking information against other social media outlets before sharing it and publishing it to reach broader public. That way, all the plans and agendas as agreed on at the virtual level will be fulfilled on the ground.

Following Bartel and Brouwer (2013), it is argued that the accessibility of new media, namely, Facebook is a sustaining condition for the development of knowledge and reflection on notions like democratic rights and practices. Due to the recent political occurrences in Morocco, the focus has been on the impact of social media in influencing democracy. Firstly, it is because of the ongoing increase in the use of Facebook among Youth and women, they become capable of expressing their ideas freely in a space that is relatively controlled .This fact is equally confirmed in Rahman (2012) whereby he states that the number of Moroccan users of the social networks, primarily Facebook, is around 5.5 million. He further notes that almost 20% of the population Facebook users are able to exchange messages, post comments, publish pictures and videos and create groups and event pages. Indeed, this growth in the number of users helps sensitize the youth and mobilize a larger public than what traditional media do. Secondly, politics is no longer considered as an issue for an elite group, but for a broader public, as one of the respondents mentioned. In fact, Moroccan citizens have acquired the skill of self-education. It is established that social media has indeed changed communication in a significant manner, and that people are now more informed than in the past. Information is more readily available unlike in the past when the government and mainstream media did not disclose all the details about factors affecting the country. By way of example, please consider the case of the Spanish rapist of Moroccan children, Daniel Galvan, which

happened in August 9, 2013. It is observed that Moroccans started to question about this cause and check information in other sources. For example, Moroccan citizens start to follow the event through Facebook, study it, analyze it, and compare it with the same information showing up in other social media outlets. In this connection, one of the author's respondents rightly notes that in the past, for example, Moroccans did not think of reading the content of the constitution, but nowadays, most Moroccans look closely to the constitution. Thirdly, social networks play an important role in helping drive democracy whereby women and youth can express their ideas freely and be informed rapidly about all that is happening at both the local and global levels. Thus, unlike in the past, minorities can now make themselves heard by voicing their problems and sharing them freely and publicly with others. It is worth pointing out that while some Moroccan activists and human rights advocates from outside Morocco may consider that the Moroccan system is still characterized as authoritarian rather than democratic, following one of the pioneering Moroccan women rights advocates. Benradi (2013) stated that despite of the uncertainty that still surrounds the future of these uprisings, women and youth in Morocco are aware of the obstacles and are determined more than ever to overcome these hardships and to realize their long awaited aspirations of equal citizenship, parity, and equal opportunity.

The Impact of Social Media on the Public Spaces

It is remarkable that it hardly finds any gender differentiation in the use of Facebook as is the case, for example, in the use of some traditional spaces (e.g., cafes) which have been and are still considered male dominated spaces. One hundred percent of the interviewees asserted that Facebook is not a male dominant space. They explained that it is used in an equal way by both females and males. In an interview with a Moroccan journalist student, he noted that through his experience, as a citizen journalist, it is women who publish more, and who share ideas more than men do on his Face book page. This social media outlet is rather a cyber space where there is no room for gender control, as noted by one of the female interviewees. She further explains that "cyber space is an alternative space for women where they can voice their ideas freely". It is a tool to let others know about what women think without being oppressed. More importantly, Facebook created an outlet for women. They started to have a new mechanism of communication with the external world whereby they are no longer afraid to express their ideas about any topic, be it related to private or public life (Sadiqi & Ennaji, 2006; Sadiqi, 2013).

It is observed that not only are social media viewed as a much better space for communication, interaction and activism at the political level, but they prove to be more powerful and advantageous than mainstream media. For example, the informants express positive attitude towards the news published by social media. However, they stress the idea that any information published on Facebook should be approached with a pinch of salt. It must be studied, analyzed, and checked against other sources before believing in it and publishing it to a broader public online. Such a way of dealing with the information reflects the high level of awareness and the degree of involvement in politics by those females and young activists. Additionally, online activism has been reported by many interviewees to have been shown to be more powerful and advantageous than mainstream media in being able to publish issues that old forms of media could not discuss, either because it is taken as a sacred issue or as a taboo. An interesting example to mention in this connection is the case of young activist who benefited from the minister of communication Mr. Khalid Naciri's statement that "In Morocco, the issue of Monarchy cannot be put into public equation, nor can it be subjected to a public debate through an opinion polle" (Kabbaj, 2013, p. 4). The young activist reacted to his statement and to his banning of the

publication of the two issues of the magazine *Tel Quel* and *Nishia* which were mainly concerned with Moroccan population's opinion about 10 years of the King Mohammed VI in power. Those 9% who did not respond positively to this issue called themselves 9% group. Another more recent example of the vital role played by Facebook in online activism has to do with the cancellation of the royal amnesty for the Spanish rapist of children, Daniel Galvan, which took place in August 9, 2013. The event was initially published online by a group of young Moroccan activists who organized a number of street protests on the basis of their online meetings. Those activities have had much pressure on the government and succeeded in making the king cancel the amnesty for the Spanish rapist of Moroccan children, and getting the rapist back to the prison. However, the mainstream media did not react at all until the king changed his decision. Then, they have only mentioned the king's report of the cancellation. Clearly, then, it follows from what has been stated above that social media (viz., Facebook) has been shown to have a lot of positive effects that change women's roles in public space. Additionally, social media opens a new horizon for women and young generation to air their views on a host of issues considered as taboos in the past decades. Taken altogether, social media tools a more influential role than mainstream media both at the level of spreading the information among a wider public and improving the quality of activism in the country.

Facebook Plays a Substantial Role in Improving the Quality of Political Activism in Comparison With the Past

In comparison with their action and activism in the last two decades, Moroccan women have managed in 2011 to forge a new political identity in the public arena thanks to the use of digital activism. Through embracing the February 20th Movement claims and strategies of activism, all women are acting and protesting to defend the idea of leadership that is adopted, but rather represent a new order of organically grown political leaders, not imposed in a top-down political parties or other organization. It is established through the interviews that the differences between "old Moroccan women associations" and those online activists emanate not from a generation gap, but rather are differences that are due to a question of emancipation and learning space for all kinds of women. In this connection, Brouwer (2013) rightly states that the accessibility of new media, such as Internet and Facebook are a sustaining condition for the development of knowledge and reflection on notions such as democratic rights and practices. Furthermore, what characterizes the new generation activists of Moroccan women is that they have drawn a new picture of feminist activism which is based on digital activism in Morocco showing their dissatisfaction with previous forms of feminist activism and its elite nature not to mention they aspire to put the whole society on democracy track. In the interviews, the majority of the movement founders noted that at the first meeting, they established that there would be no leaders of the movement, rather the meeting would be conducted openly for everyone to talk and make decisions collectively. They consider themselves all as leaders.

Conclusion

From the analysis of the above hypotheses, the author came to the following conclusions which are largely based on the interviews conducted.

(1) The first hypothesis was confirmed in that digital activism improves the quality of political activism. Facebook as one of those social media outlets has a positive effect on spreading the culture of democracy in the country. A lot issues that were considered as sacred or taboos are now freely discussed among women and youngsters through the sharing of information, planning for real life meetings during the February 20th

Movements whereby people from 60 cities although Morocco went out on the same day and at the same time to protest as cited by the interviewees.

(2) Women and youth are now endowed with more freedom of expression as confirmed by a young journalist who openly states that from his experience as a citizen journalist, he has more women visiting, publishing, and sharing information on his Facebook page.

(3) Facebook as a social media outlet has been confirmed to play a substantial role among women activists in the digital world in comparison with the real world women's association in the past .

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The Community Radio in Thailand: 2012 Onwards

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Radio broadcasting services in Thailand are in transition and face an uncertain future. This situation has arisen from enforcement of the 2010 Frequency Allocation and Telecommunications Business Act and the establishment of the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) as a single, combined regulatory body for broadcasting and telecommunications. The Act brings in significant changes through “liberalization” in telecoms and broadcasting markets. Key events expected in the future, such as the implementation of AEC in 2015 and the transformation from analog to digital systems will have significant detrimental impact on the Thai broadcasting industry. These changes will affect 524 AM and FM radio stations and around 7,000 community radio operations. This paper gives a picture of radio broadcasting industry, especially of community radio stations, their history, present and future. It also argues that the survival of radio stations in Thailand after 2015 will depend on (1) its social, institutional, financial, and technical abilities; and (2) the ability of NBTC to adopt and enforce policy and regulation for promoting free and fair competition.

Keywords: digitalization, community radio, broadcasting

Introduction

The Thai broadcasting industry has been dominated by government agencies which own the spectrum frequency. Some of these agencies operate television and radio stations on their own whilst others allow private companies to run the broadcasting business via concession contracts. Before the commencement of the first community radio station in 2001, the Government Public Relations Department (PRD) controlled 147 stations, the Army owned 127 stations, the Air Force ran 36 stations while 62 stations were under the Mass Communication Organization of Thailand (MCOT).

The 1997 Constitution was the starting point to change this picture. It aimed to create formal broadcasting regulation by establishing the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) as an independent regulator. However, political and legislative struggles, the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC) was set in 2007, followed by the appointment of NBTC commissioners in late 2011, and the “broadcasting licenses” procedure has been in operation from 2012, replacing the old system of concessions. In this sense, the prolong political and legislative struggles caused the vacuum of broadcasting regulation during 1997-2011.

Broadcasting regulation vacuum over a decade was the main factor driving community radio (CR) in Thailand. CR stations were allowed by the 1997 Constitution. However, all stations without regulatory body meant operating unlicensed. The political turmoil since 2008 and the anti-competitive behavior of the broadcasting industry led to a growth in the number of political related radio stations, mainly created by the

“Red Shirt” movement loyal to the exiled former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The “Yellow Shirt” movement in opposition to the “Red Shirts” also has community radio stations in the Bangkok area. The situation ran until June 2012. CR stations operated under temporary licenses issued by the NBTC. Along with structural changes—from a state-controlled via concessions entity into a fully competitive one under NBTC licensing—the Thai broadcasting industry, especially CRs, faces new struggle and new broadcasting technologies.

This paper explores the path of CR practitioners, their struggle from the time when first CR emerged until 2013—the period when NBTC licensing is in operation. The study was conducted by depth-interviews and focus groups when the depth-interview was not possible. The period of data collection was during October 2012 to February 2013. Two hundred CRs and FM radio practitioners in Bangkok, Nakorn Rachasima, Khon Khen, U-bonrachathani, and Pathum Thai gave their stories. Information from interviews sessions carried out from October to December 2013 was cited in this paper in order to portrait the current situation.

The Definition of Community Radio

The sector’s global networking body, the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC), provides the following general definition as part of its membership criteria: A community radio station is a station that responds to the needs of the community, which it serves and contributes to its development in a progressive manner by promoting social change. It promotes the democratization of communication by facilitating community participation in communication. This participation may vary according to the context in which the radio operates. In other words, CR physically, philosophically, and structurally is volunteer directed, and takes on a wide variety of social aims according to the collective goals of the participants, and operates using low-power transmitters, often on FM bands ranging from five or 10 W up to 1000 W. The broadcasting equipment may be housed in a radio station or a person’s home.

There is no precise global headcount of CR stations; if there were, it would doubtless change on a daily basis. In Thailand, for example, CR began with a single station in 2001; within one year there were more than 100 stations on air (Ubonrat, 2005). In 2004, Thai governmental and non-governmental estimates placed the number of stations at 2000. By 2005, the number most frequently reported in the press was in the 3,000 range (Macan-Markar, 2006). In 2009, the Royal Thai Army estimated that there were 5,000 stations (Komsan, 2009), while the Prime Minister’s Office placed the number at 7,000 (IFEX, 2009).

Given the large numbers being reported, clearly CR is a phenomenon worth the close attention of media scholars and communications planners. But, as with all grass-roots media activities, it is more than numbers that tell the tale of community radio, its meanings, and its impacts. Looking at the example of Thailand, this paper will provide a concrete example of the political, regulatory and social issues that have accompanied sudden—and at times unforeseen—CR emergence within heretofore highly controlled radio environments.

A History of Struggle

Since radio’s advent in Thailand in the 1930s, broadcasting has been closely tied to the formation of a modern national identity, based on central Thai lowlands culture and language, and on a discourse of modernization and industrial development (Thailand Public Relations Department 2007). In law, the broadcast frequency spectrum was made the property of the state, with access to frequencies enforced under the Post and Telegraph Act (1940). In 1955, the Radio and Television Act clarified that actual ownership of radio and

television stations was the exclusive privilege of the Public Relations Department (PRD) and the Ministry of Defence, which in turn assigned ownership to various divisions of the Royal Thai Army (Ubonrat, 1994). Later, the list included the Mass Communications Organization of Thailand (MCOT), and an agency under the Prime Minister's Office (Luksana, 2004).

Effectively, the system operated as a dual monopoly, with the army and government radio stations at times battling one another and at times working in concert, depending on the politics of the day. The army turned its piece of the airwaves into a highly lucrative business, leasing broadcast concessions, and airtime to private interests (Elliott, 2010). Under this system, 524 AM and FM radio stations enjoyed legal sanction in 2006 (Thailand Public Relations Department 2006). The result was that radio looked and sounded free but was not free, because the government and the army controlled the studios.

Article 40 of the Constitution B. E. 2540 (1997) laid down a mandate for broadcasting reform. It contained a watershed statement: "Transmission frequencies for radio or television broadcasting and radio telecommunication are national communication resources for public interest". The article promised "an independent regulatory body having the duty to distribute the frequencies under paragraph one and supervise radio or television broadcasting and telecommunication businesses as provided by law". No longer would access to the airwaves be the fiefdom of a closed clique of Generals and Government officials.

According to the Frequency Allocation Organization and Regulation of Broadcasting and Telecommunications Act B. E. 2543 (2000), two independent regulators of the state will be established to manage spectrum allocation and to administer license allocations and renewals for broadcasting and telecommunications, in order to achieve the above aims. Article 20 of this law also provides that 20 percent of available frequencies would be allocated to the people's sector, who may use it for non-commercial and community-oriented purposes. The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) was set up in 2004 while two rounds of selection for its counterpart—the National Broadcast Commission (NBC)—in 2001 and 2005 failed.

Despite of the failed selections of the NBC and the consequent absence of a broadcast regulator, media reform movements seemed to move forward, as exemplified by Wittayu Siang Chumchon/Radio Community Voice that took to the air in December 2001 (Luksana, 2004). Using a 10 W transmitter situated in an orchard, the station reached an estimated audience of 20,000-40,000 villagers in Kanchanaburi province in the west of Thailand (Gonzalez, 2002).

Wittayu Siang Chumchon's founders had become socially active during protests against a Thai-Burma gas pipeline; they perceived radio had great potential to give voice to this and other local concerns. Radio host Boonsang Jansongratsamee explained: "this station is about two-way communication and listener participation. We remind people about their rights to access the media and encourage them to make use of the airwaves" (Gonzalez, 2002, p. 3). It can be said that the long history of dual monopoly, with the army and government radio stations landscape was openly challenged for the first time.

CR also faced many obstructions, despite promises were made on paper. Ubonrat (1999) reports that the state, mainly through the Public Relations Department (PRD), has staged many efforts to interfere and clamp down on CR. One of the first efforts was to rule that all CR stations broadcast with a 30W transmitter, using antenna not higher than 30 meters, and airing signals within a 15 square kilometer radius. This requirement took no account of geographical locations or landscape surrounding each station that may have specific problems and requirements such as mountainous areas or a widely dispersed community. This technical

condition became known later as the 30-30-15 requirement.

Besides the technical regulation, the PRD argued on grounds that during the transitional period and in the absence of a new legislation, the people could not claim their rights based explicitly on the Constitution. Based on such rationale, CR was viewed as pirate radio and measures were taken to ban, arrest, and threaten CR operators. But CR practitioners and activists resisted the ban, trying to ally themselves with civil society and independent institutions like the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and academics. After a protracted struggle, the PRD which controlled the National Broadcasting Board (acting as interim broadcasting regulator) announced in 2003 that all CR must register with the PRD to remain in operation. In 2004, the PRD issued a landmark measure that permitted a six-minute advertisement on CR. This in effect transformed CR into commercial radio as more than 1,500 new stations were set up within a few months after the announcement by local entrepreneurs, local and national politicians, and media professionals across the country, including Bangkok. As a result, the reformist rationale of CR was completely stolen by political and commercial forces.

This regulatory mess was worsened with the second failed selection of members for the National Broadcasting Commission in 2005 following the Supreme Administrative Court's ruling that the selection procedure was not transparent and involved major conflicts of interest. Under this disarray, there were no reliable statistics as to the total number of CR stations in operation. According to the figures released by the PRD in 2005, however, an estimated number of 7,000 CR stations were on air. This includes those which registered with the PRD as well as those which did not. Of this, one-thirds belonged to music and media conglomerates wishing to penetrate the grassroots audiences. A significant portion of these became political stations with obvious partisanship. Meanwhile, the stations which represented the original concept of CR only accounted for fewer than 10 percent of the total number of existing stations (Pirongrong, 2009).

CR stations were subject to harassment following the major political crisis in 2006 in which daily demonstrations were staged on Bangkok's main thoroughfares by the People Alliance for Democracy (PAD) against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra over many charges of corruption and human rights violations. A Bangkok-based CR station proclaiming to promote democracy was rounded up while about 1,000 more around the country were closed down or threatened with closure. The rationale for the forced shutdown was the usual argument of "interference with aviation signals" (interview, 2012).

Another critical turning point took place in September 2006 when a military junta staged a coup d'état that overthrew the civilian government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The Council for Democratic Reform (CDR) (later the Council for National Security or CNS) abolished the 1997 Constitution and imposed martial law. CR stations in the North and the Northeast were closed down under the argument that CR was a product of the 1997 Charter so they had to expire likewise. However, the CDR revised the decision in early October and allowed CR stations to continue operating but under very strict conditions. These conditions include for instance, obligations to broadcast all orders and announcements of the CDR, refraining from criticisms of a political nature that may lead to misunderstanding or apprehensions, discontinuing of phone-in radio programs, and stringent enforcement of the 30-30-15 technical requirement. In addition, from January to May 2007, the interim government installed by the CDR has consistently requested cooperation from all community radio stations countrywide to present "balanced and appropriate" news and information "in order to rehabilitate social harmony and peace". Meanwhile, CR stations continued to experience intimidation of various kinds ranging from surveillance, site search, to station closedown. Self-censorship became a new norm adopted by CR practitioners while a great number of stations resorted to music and apolitical talk as their main program

formats.

In principle, all CR stations must cease operation and wait for their licenses to be issued by the new regulator. However, the interim government allowed those that are still operating to continue. The working group on CR was later formed, consisting mainly of sub-committee members and additional appointed members. The working group which began working in late 2008 has been instrumental in drafting the licensing criteria and administering the ongoing CR registration and licensing process.

Table 1

Types of Radio Stations

Type/label	Origin/development	Main policy agenda	No.
Civic community radio (community services—geographical and issue-based)	(1) first wave of community radio practitioners—originated from the CR learning center (2) operated under the “owned and managed by, and empowering the community” principle (3) not for profit, not commercially-driven coordinated under the National Federation of Community Radio	(1) To be granted licenses for operation (2) To be accorded legal protection (3) To be eligible for financial or technical support	150-200
Local commercial radio	(1) born as a result of the Cabinet Resolution on 24 June 2003 legalizing a six-minute advertising spot on community radio (2) operated by small to medium-sized entrepreneurs in local communities around the country (3) commercially run with 6-8 minutes/hour of advertising, of which 70% featuring local products and services (4) coordinated under the Association of Professional Community Broadcasters	(1) to be granted licenses, and accorded legal protection (2) opposing the auction model of licensing envisioned in new frequency allocation draft law	3,000
Local government radio	Public relations and communication tools of local government agencies e.g., university, hospitals	N. A.	500
Religious radio	(1) monks, priests, and religious organizations wanting to disseminate religious preaching to local communities (2) non-profit (3) individual community stations as well as network of stations across widespread localities and regions	to be granted licenses, accorded legal protection, and guaranteed access to the airwaves	500
Nominee radio for media conglomerates	(1) Commercial (2) format programming with mainstream music dominating the content	N. A.	500-1,000 (may overlap with commercial community radio)
Political radio	(1) commercial (2) political propaganda and clear political partisanship		200
National security radio	(1) promoting national security for centralized government agencies such as the Armed Forces (2) found in areas with insurgency problems like the three Southernmost provinces		200-300

Note. Source: summary from Pirongrong, www.thai-mpc.org, access 1st May 2013.

According to the working group on CR, more than 6,000 local community stations registered with NTC in August 2009 to notify their intent to be on the air, using the CR label. However, Pirongrong (2009) notices that the majority of stations that registered in August 2009 are in fact local commercial radio which would fit under the sub-class of commercial radio licenses—local broadcasting—according to the Broadcasting Act 2008. Only 120 stations would be qualified as CR.

The New Law: NBTC Act 2010

The entry into force in December 2010 of the Act on Organization to Assign Radio Frequency and to Regulate the Broadcasting and Telecommunications Services B. E. 2553 (2010) (The NBTC Act 2010) brings about a significant change and concrete action which ensures the development in telecoms and broadcasting industry in Thailand. Such change and current development deal mainly with the new law, the NBTC Act 2010, altogether with the first establishment of the National Broadcasting and Telecommunications Commission (NBTC), an independent convergent regulator. There are 11 commissioners with expertise in different subjects who went through a competitively selective process and were formally appointed by the Head of State, HM King Bhumiphol. The convergent regulator NBTC is divided into two sub-commissions, telecoms, and broadcasting commissions, for the reason that they can specifically perform their roles and duties in a complementary manner. However, the joint authority and responsibility still remain in terms of (1) spectrum management which must be consistent with the Radio Frequency Plan and; (2) adopting policy and regulation which promote free and fair competition and with due regard to public interest.

Formerly, the long-term monopoly over telecoms and broadcastings was in the form of concession contracts and state ownership or state-run administration. The NBTC Act 2010, which is consistent with the Constitution of 2007 brings about the significant change in telecoms and broadcasting market in Thailand as it requires “liberalization” in telecoms and broadcasting markets. The radio frequency, which is a national and scarce resource, will be allocated on a market-based approach (auction). The exclusive right for using the spectrum through concession contract will completely terminate (depending on their remaining period according to concession contract). Under the new regime, the telecoms and broadcasting markets in Thailand have been gradually and continuously developed resulting from the new regulatory framework and environment carried out by the NBTC.

The regulatory void that has allowed CR to flourish in the last few years has been a mixed blessing. Industrious Thais have taken advantage of the relatively “free market” of airwaves to fill them up with hundreds of small, locally run stations. They continue to operate “under the radar” of the Government to some degree, while offering a critical alternative to the voice of RTG-controlled stations.

But privately, both the PRD and NGOs admitted that the true total number of stations is unknown. Estimates range from 2,000 to 3,000. (Note: The RTG owns and controls 524 officially registered “regular” AM and FM radio stations in the country. The military and police services control 230 radio stations; PRD and the Mass Communications Organization of Thailand (MCOT) control over 170 stations combined. Nearly all of these stations are leased to commercial companies).

CR stations all over the country have now come under a regulation which requires them to abide by the law or face closure. CR stations which have registered with the National Telecommunications Commission were required to meet the criteria set down in the regulation. Those stations which had not registered with the NTC were required to do so by the deadline set in the announcement. CR stations should not be used for political campaigning against or for any particular group or party. They must be truly used for public services as clearly stated in the regulation.

However, during the period of this study (October 2012 to January 2013), an estimated 2,000 or more (perhaps as many as 3,000) unregistered CR stations continue to broadcast popular news and “call in” talk shows. Many unregistered “Red Shirt” stations have been reported, but they are still on air (interview,

November 2012). A number of “Religious stations” still broadcast using antennae that are too high. One interviewee voiced concern that the NBTC new rule has created a hole for “black” business. For instance, many “associations” are set up and charged 20,000-40,000 baht for membership. These issues have been voiced to the NBTC committee without feedback, and thus many CR stations would not put their trust in NBTC. Moreover, many government agencies and rural authorities have started their own radio stations, hence by-passing the need for CR.

Final Verdict: Can CRs Survive During Digitalization

With all political struggles, the CRs also face many more struggles resulting from technology changes. During 2012-2015 the country is turning to digital technology. Digitalized television license is bidding out in 2014, which will eventually replacing analog broadcasting system. However, most CRs are not ready for digitalization. They face many problems as following. Firstly, management problem. Many interviewees reported not enough budget to run the station. Since CRs are not allowed to advertise, they relied on communities’ donation and run on voluntary basis. Some of them are considering to turn to commercial radio or closed down. Thus, they cannot abide NBTC rules. Secondly, technological problem. The airwave issues are still not fixed by NBTC such as spillover effect. Moreover, a number of CRs run for many years. Their broadcasting equipment is old or broken. Finally, manpower problem. CRs operators are retired or near retired persons. They have limited knowledge of new technology and new regulations as well as outdated knowledge of broadcasting. CRs require NBTC to set up community radio fund, community broadcasting foundation, self-regulation and co-regulation, and sustainable development in terms of social, institutional, financial, and technical areas. It could be said that most CRs are in very unstable situation. Along with their main management problem, technological problem and manpower problem, CRs are still facing problem from NBTC. Almost all cases referred that NBTC rules are unclear; the officers are unprofessional and very slow in process. This claim can be seen from a number of illegal CRs that are still on air. Above all, only 193 community radios, 388 public-service community radios, and 1,004 commercial radios—out of more than 6,000 CRs who applied for license, just got license (by June, 2013, <http://thainfcr.org/node/93#sthash.20tv9gXc.dpuf>).

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The Reality of Nigerian Image From the Perspective of The Home Videos

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The home video through its offering plays pivotal roles of information, education and entertainment. It has provided knowledge to the viewing audience and directs their attention to issues to think about and/or learn. Popularly called Nollywood, the home video industry has brought scholars, reporters, reviewer, journalists, investors, and different kinds of people to the country; to investigate, invest, and observe the industry or network with people. Through the portrayals and representations of Nigeria and its people, a lot of people, especially foreigners and Nigerians in the Diaspora have come to understand the socio-economic and political terrain of the nation based on the home videos offerings; thus the need to x-ray the depictions in the Nigerian home video films to ascertain the reality of their Nigerian image from the perspectives. The study was undertaken through content analysis of 50 video films which were televised as programmes on television stations in Lagos and Africa Magic (a cable network station), within the framework of agenda-setting and cultivation theories. The results reveal that while the home video producers have effectively revealed Nigerians as religious and traditional people, very little has been done to portray the economic and investment potentials of the nation; the nation's symbols like flags, coat of arm, currencies amongst others are barely revealed; negative attitudes of get-rich-quick, get-rich-at-all-cost, witchcraft, and fetish practices as well as violence, hooliganism, and ritualism amongst other things are often exaggerated in the films. Following the home video portrayals and representations, it could be imagined that the Nigerian urban environment is as beautiful and rich with predominantly affluent and flamboyant people as are depicted in the home videos. The misrepresentations, overrepresentations, and under-presentations of the nation's image in the home video can be very detrimental to the nation's socio-economic development especially as the nation's destiny is indirectly related to its image. They can further pose challenges to the attitudes and responses of people from other nations to the Nigerian citizens within and outside the country. Furthermore, some Nigerian citizens, especially the youths could aspire to and learn certain lifestyles and attitudes projected in the home videos as acceptable.

Keywords: reality, image, home video, perspective

Introduction

The home video is a narrowcast medium (contrary to broadcasting or open air television and radio) whose contents are relayed through audio-visual means and is commonly available to a specific target or anyone with means to access it in terms of language, economy and technology acquisition (Alawode, 2007). The Nigerian

home video industry is a thriving medium which has replaced or substituted the celluloid-produced films. The media through the offering of the home videos plays pivotal roles of information, education, and entertainment. It provides knowledge to the viewing audience and directs their attention to issues to think about and/or learn. The home video industry popularly called Nollywood has brought scholars, reporters, reviewers, journalists, investors, and different kinds of people to the country. Some of the people come to investigate, invest, and observe the industry or network with its people (Adenugba, 2007). As a watchdog, provider of knowledge and facilitator of public discussion, the offerings of the home video cannot be understated in our contemporary society. Along with the other media organs, it can be in the frontline to project the image of the Nigerian nation to the world. According to Gauntlett (2002), the media shows us situations and relationships from other people's point of view; it is part of the external fascination of drama that we can see "how the world works" in lives other than our own. Ekwuazi (1991) posits that the film is a cultural index; a cultural reflector, a socializing agent, and therefore the instrument of cultural dynamics. He further explains that the film constitutes an industry whose production is directly ideological. What this means is that, in this case, home video projects what it seeks to communicate to its audience, what it seeks to sell, what it wants its audience to understand, and what it wants its audience to imbibe. It is in this wise that the review of the image of Nigeria and its people as portrayed through the home videos is considered. Adenugba (2007) further opined that as "film is a popular culture and as expected, it must mirrorize, recreate, and tell stories of the societies in which it subsists. The Nigerian film industry is no exception". It has been able to portray an image of the Nigerian people and state, which as a matter of fact is the reason why the Nigerian motion picture industry is a beehive of activities—research, investments, visits, and so on.

The Problem

The home video is a medium of communication which can be utilized by many individuals, people, and organizations for different purposes and advantages (and disadvantages). For the film maker, actors/actresses, and others in Nollywood, it is a medium through which they express themselves and make a living as well. For the viewers in general, it serves for relaxation (though information and education can be obtained). For the viewers outside the country, it could be used to make findings and source of information on the country. For the government of Nigeria, it can be a medium through export of the video films: to increase its foreign exchange earnings, to inform prospective investors about opportunities in the country as well as export and transfer cultures to others, amongst other advantages. For the Nigerians in Diaspora, through home videos, they can familiarize themselves with the Nigerian cultures and values. The Nigerian children born in foreign countries can learn their cultures and languages through the videos.

The home videos can inform, educate, advertise, market, sell, and rebrand Nigeria and all its concerns while also providing entertainment to its viewers. They can influence viewers directly or indirectly as well as positively and/or negatively. They can indoctrinate and disabuse the viewers towards and against certain actions, attitudes, lifestyle, cultures, people, and community including nation-state. Viewers' reactions and responses to issues and characters are as a result of the images and representations in the films. Lacey (2009) tells us that the media "represents" the world. It mediates between the audience and what is represented. According to him, images in sequences are usually structured so that the audience can readily understand the space in which the narration is taking place. According to Akangbe (2008), drama is a recreation of society and a megaphone for projecting sentiments, aspirations, failings, attainments, history, changes, etc., of a society.

Thus, he asserts that drama is a veritable medium of picturing a particular society with a view to educating, informing and entertaining the audience. The question therefore is: Are the portrayals of Nigeria in the home video the reality of the Nigerian image, people and situations?

McQuail (2005) posits that society and culture are inseparable; one cannot exist without the other. Media and what they produce can be considered as a part of culture. The media which is the domain of society refers to the material base (economic and political resource and power) to social relationships (in national societies, communities, families, etc.) to social roles and occupations; they are socially regulated (formally and informally). The domain of culture refers primarily to other essential aspect of social life, especially to symbolic expression, meanings, and practices (social customs, institutional ways of doing things and also personal habits). Akangbe informs that culture is a summation of an individual and collective life of a society which comprises its idea, behavior, social, religion, and political particularities, sentiment and expression. He further identifies the obvious indices of culture as religion, language, philosophy, polity, technology, architecture, engineering, customs, dance, drama, and dressing, amongst others. All these can be identified in all the home videos. According to Gauntlett (2002), identities are complex constructions and include gender which is a part of an individual's identity of self; ethnicity which may reflect as community in extreme social circumstance; and other aspects of identity as class, age, disability and sociability.

According to him, factors that could contribute to a sense of identity include education, urban or rural residency, and cultural background, access to transportation and communication, criminal record, prosecution or refugee status. Katherine Hamley (n.d.) says that identity is something that is constructed over a period of time and can constantly be updated or changed completely. The home video has been one of the major medium towards identity (image) construction and deconstruction and status conferral. Many people (youths and adults alike) have learnt a lot (lifestyle, dressing, language, etc.) from the home videos. The home video truly serves to mould lives indirectly; it is the mirror of the society. Are Nigeria, its people and their settings represented in the home videos realistically? To what extent are the home videos used for image construction and deconstruction?

Literature

A number of literatures abound on the subject of film and nation building and other related issues. However, the subject of Nigerian image in the home videos (motion pictures) seems to be evolving and contemporary. Following contributions by researchers, reviewers, and media practitioners who have in different ways considered the subject, attempts would be made to x-ray the reality of Nigerian image from the perspective of the home videos.

The Nigerian Home Video

Informed by Ekweme (2002), the appearance of video films in Nigeria plus its popularity points to its importance as a medium for the production, dissemination, and consumption of film as a form of popular culture with its ideology and aesthetics. Akeh (2008) posits that the era of foreign films in Nigerian homes has gone, and now is the time that Nigerian situation as presented by Nigerian actors and actresses is seen not only in Nigerian homes but all over Africa and the rest of the world. He quotes from Tejumola Olaniyan's *Scar of Conquest* and *Mark of Resistance* (1995:1) and suggests that Nigerian films are independent and ripe to be judged and analyzed on their own merits. In agreement with Wole Soyinka, he expresses that the bottom line is

distinction between the dominant and emergent marginal art of Africa and other post-colonial societies. The reason given is because the difference we are seeking to define between European and African drama as one of man's formal representations of experience is neither simply a difference of style or form nor is it confined to drama alone; it is a representative of the essential differences between two world views; a difference between one culture whose artifacts are evidence of a cohesive understanding of irreducible truths and another, whose creative impulse are directed by periodic dialectics (1976:38). By this, it is understood that African films (in this case, Nigerian) should be evaluated based on its merit and relative to its culture.

While celebrating the fact that indigenous Nigerian film makers have evolved the video film culture as an affordable means of (re)presenting the Nigerian nation to silver screen, Haynes (2005) asserts:

Ake (2008) puts succinctly that Nigerian actors and actresses are gradually becoming celebrities world over. He however condemns the inability of Nigerian motion pictures to meaningfully contribute to either national orientation or international image building, noting, for instance the negative image of the country and its citizens in the Nigerian home videos. He further alerts the readers of the problems of cultural bastardization and corner cutting from some movie producers which are aimed at profit maximization but in actual fact, they are not only abuse of evidence psyche and finance, but also clear causes of misrepresentation of Nigerians.

Nigerian Image in the Home Videos

According to Ekwuazi (1991), a film industry that aspires to be in the vanguard of national development must do the following:

Raise the level of consciousness through liberating the spirits and strengthening the minds of its people; Be political—must deal in a positive manner with the existing conditions of oppression; Educate—educate to bring out that which is already within, give knowledge and truth; Clarify issues, by enlightening participants as to why so many negative conditions and images exist in their community in order to eliminate the negative condition and strengthen the positive condition; Lastly, it must entertain. (p. 160)

Akande (2010) documents his contributions on Nigerian image from the perspective of the home video which was published in *The Nation Newspaper* at different times spanning December 21, 2008 to September 25, 2010 in his book: *Hazy Pictures: The Arts, Business and Politics of the Nigerian Motion Picture Industry*. However, a cursory review of all the contributions on the subject reveals an earnest desire by the researchers and scholars to see an impactful home video industry.

Akande asks and provides answers to why it should not be a problem even if the movies are made in Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa or Ibibio to project our indigenous cultures with pride. Referring to the Hindu films which are noted to be making waves around the world through consistency in promoting the Indian culture and now their civilization is changing the world; he gives an example of the frequency of singing and dancing in the films. Giving credence to *Slumdog Millionaire*, the film that won the good film of the decade, he intimates that Hindu was the main language spoken in the film which was awarded by Hollywood.

In his article of June 21, 2009, he replays the launching of the nation's rebranding campaign with slogan—*Nigeria's Good People, Great Nation* and concurs with the former minister of information, Professor Dora Akunyili that Nollywood is the greatest cultural export and if not for piracy, the film industry would have overtaken oil. The former minister had charged the practitioners in the movie industry to tell positive stories about Nigeria. According to her, telling good stories does not mean that the ugly state of the country should not be criticized but practitioners should be balanced.

In his article—*Film Making—Rebranding: Will Nollywood Agree to Lie?* (May 3, 2009), Akande describes film making as setting an object against the sun. The obscure reflection being what is largely referred to as fiction because it is taken as vivid imagination of reality if the colouration is expunged. Hence, he reflects on the suggestion by the former minister, Prof Dora Akunliyi at a meeting with the film makers which she implored them to as much as possible reflect Nigeria in positive light in movies; and hopes that the minister had not just discovered a propaganda tool in the medium of film. He asserts that apart from acts of voodoo in Nollywood films, most representations about the police, Nigerian politicians, academic system, the power industry, health sector, etcetera, are just appropriate.

In his article—*Americans Don't Watch Nigerian Films* (January 25, 2009), he reports the opinion of Marc Wishengrad, the Emmy nominated director of photography and pioneer trainer in the popular SHOOT workshop of the Nigerian Film Corporation (NFC) in Jos. According to him, people throughout the world know what life is like in America without ever setting their feet on its borders which is because movies tell stories of common people and the way they live. He said he had little or no idea of what life was like in Nigeria because Nigerian films are not like American movie theatres.

Akande (2010) says that if the above statement is attributed to a film maker who is given to researches and has knowledge of film industry in other parts of the world than America, then you can imagine what an average American, European, Indian would have to say about whether or not they have an idea of Nollywood or what it stands for. He suggests that it is possible that other types of films which have unique stories about African history and experience may attract foreigners. To confirm this, he reports his interaction with Hollywood film maker, Ron Lavey in Canada in 2008, who was feeling excited to be working on Ken Saro Wiwa's story. This rekindled a comment Marc (above) had earlier made: It will be a wonderful day when Africans tell their own stories, filling the silver screen with their personal stories and not looking to emulate Hollywood style but to look at how stories have been told within one's culture.

On his part, Adenugba informs us that culture is an essential aspect of aesthetics, particularly because film subsists in culture and also because it is made for audience that has a culture, whether the audience is culturally inclined or not. Hence film tends to reflect the culture or nuances of the philosophy of the society that produces it. Films from China promote the culture of that nation and its people. Films from India reflect the music, dance, dressing, and beliefs of the Eastern nations; movies from the United States of America highlight the values and patterns of daily life of that country. Nollywood movies uphold the ways of life and happenings of Nigeria. Films are cultural ambassadors of the society in which they are produced; film is an instrument of cultural proclamation. Each society tells its story. The cultural context of a film helps to explain where the film maker's allegiance lies—whether it lies with culture or something else other than a sense of belonging or inclination to his realm.

Adenugba further states that not only does culture facilitate development, it also provides ample raw materials for the film maker to work with. Folklores, myths, fabrics, legends, folk music, folk dance, costume, folk architecture, ritual practices, kingship rites, and other elements and aspects of culture are ready materials that the film maker can explore, borrow, adapt, or use verities in his work. He recognizes that Lagbaja, Asa, Yinka Davies, Fela Anikupola-Kuti, and King Sunny Ade as Nigerian musicians who have blended their indigenous cultures with music thrill even the foreigners. Tunde Kelani's works gives glamour in films because of his appropriation of culture in storytelling, costume design, set design, music, props, gestures, expression and use of language. Adenugba gives examples of cultural hits as: *Igodo* (Don Pedro Obaseki, 2000),

Saworoide (Tunde Kelani, 2001), *Sango* (Obafemi Lasode, 1996), *King Solomon's Mine* (Compton Bennett & Andrew Marton, 1950)

He puts it succinctly that culture serves as a basis of realism in movies. A work that is built on cultural nuances and conventions of a society is better accepted as an original statement about that society than those that do not. He cites examples of *Dangerous Twin* (Tade Ogidan, 2004), *Rattle Snakes I, II, III, IV* (Amaka Igwe Isaac, 1991-1996) as text books about Nigeria in contemporary times while films like *False Alarm* (2006), *Chameleon 1 and II* (2006) are refuted by critics as non-representation of Nigeria because of the un-Nigerian story nature in *False Alarm*, the conflict is between a Nigerian "FBI" and Chief Lord Lugard Donko.

Adenugba's argument is that every film should reflect as faithfully as possible to the limit that funding and technicalities would allow the culture of its society or the society that is being depicted; only then that can the film gain from the enormous aesthetics benefits that the culture provides for film making.

In Akaoso's article posted online (December, 12, 2009) which is a reaction to Professor Akunliyi's assertion that the Nigerian film industry has contributed to the nation's poor image, he says it is misplaced and out of reality. Rather he asserts that Nollywood has done a lot within a short time of its existence to place Nigeria on the map of international film industries. According to him, over the years, the industry has promoted certain identities and images about the country which in a way have helped to boost the country's reputation. He posits that Nollywood has been able to shoot up the socio-economic profile of the country especially during an era in which the nation was notorious for military coups and political instability. He infers that the production of films in the military epoch, which explores the lives of Nigerians, shows the world that Nigerians are innovative, creative, and balanced irrespective of the social upheaval in the country. It also negated the bad image which was generated in the international press about the nation during the period. He adds that the Nigerian motion picture industry has helped to change the perception of the rest of the world about Nigeria and indeed the whole Africa through the films produced. Many people outside the continent especially those who have never set their feet on its soil have come to understand that Nigerians and Africans do not live on trees or walk about naked (as had been speculated previously) nor are blood thirsty and cruel but people are just like other people in other countries of the world who could be bad, good, greedy, nice because people are regardless of their nationalities and locations. Furthermore, the industry has shown to the world that the nation is undeniably the giant of Africa. Quoting a BBC world report which once mentioned Nigerian film industry, the author says it "has turned the lights on Africa cinema".

He further writes that over the years, the industry has promoted certain identities and images which critics have frowned at. Some of the images include—ritualistic society, images of a violent society, the poor portrayal of the Nigerian women, and a display of a highly ostentatious and an oligarchic society. Imageries and ideas that have largely become norms because of profiteering have replaced art. Corroborating Musa (Punch, August, 2006), he informs people that Nollywood is a disappointment (story option); movies should be socio-cultural development tools if well-crafted which Nollywood movies are not. Rather, they carry boring story lines, portraying low intellectualism, and technical unprofessionalism. He expresses that although movies with themes and stories of ritual and violence have been explored and exposed events that happen in the country on a regular basis, they also exaggerate and at best have turned many persons into cynics who believe that every other person is out to learn and because films shape society and help orientate the people while also entertaining them; the films have subtly encouraged people to engage in such amoral and vile activities because they encounter them in the films. People have learnt to consult medium and perform sacrifices in

attempt to solve their problems. He also adds that there are lots of domestic violence in Nigerian films.

The author of the Editorial in *The Economist* (December 16, 2010) titled *Nollywood: Lights, Camera, Africa* posits that the African elites sneer at the frequent display of witchcraft in Nigerian films. Traditional curses are imposed, spirit wander, juju blood flows. The tribulations of modern life are often shown to be the result of shadowy machination. Murder and occult are never far from the surface. Quoting Emem Isong, a producer, “it is the Nollywood equivalent of Hollywood horror movies”. Yet tormented characters often find salvation by turning to Christ. A church scene is de rigueur in Nollywood film; many Nollywood stars are born-again Christians. Film credits usually ends with the invocation: To God be the glory! Helen Ukpabio explains “all the movies from our stable are means of spreading the gospel in preparation of rapture”. According to Lancelot Imaseun, the film plots too have strong Pan—African appeal. They often revolve around the travails of new arrivals in big cities—an experience familiar across the continent. Nollywood films depict families whose faith has been shattered; they show ordinary people struggling to make sense of a fast-changing unkind world; aspirations are dashed; trust is forsaken. The overriding theme of Nollywood film is Africa’s troubled journey to modernity. He asserts that for decades, many Africans have complained that western media has been showing only calamities like war, diseases, corruption, and famine. They have come to see film as an antidote. Film also profoundly shapes how Africans see their own continent.

As reported by Christian Putsch in *Time* magazine (July 20, 2011), “anyone who really wants to understand the hardship, dreams, and ambitions of the people in Nigeria should take in one of Imaseun’s movies”. Nollywood movies most often tell gripping stories about love and betrayal, upward mobility or power of good over evil. People tell stories Nigerians can identify unlike Hollywood movies, theirs do not always have a happy end. The world’s not fair, so why should they pretend it is? Many Nollywood movies are overtly evangelical, others address questions of religious diversity such as the popular film, *One God, One Nation*, about the obstacles faced by a Muslim and a Christian in attempt to marry each other. Nwaoko (2012) is not happy with the fact that most films made in Nigeria in English, Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa languages which tend to promote the upper class of our society with luxuries here and there have compelled people to want to be rich at all costs while films that can exhibit and promote both middle and lower classes have been relegated because any nation must have the three or four classes, and all contribute to the development, growth, and progress of the nation on their own. He further asserts that lumpen proletariat films are not common in Nigeria implying that most of our trained film marketers do not want the viewers to grow in taste and types. Most of them go for commercially viable films which may not necessarily educate viewers positively; they want to make money, but not to influence positive radical change. He advises that:

(1) All of such should be looked into and entrenched in film productions henceforth because life is not one-sided;

(2) People should also consider revolutionary films that can check terrorists and tame their corrupt leaders as well as discourage terrorists and bandits while promoting good character.

He observes that people may not be able to portray them in those commercially viable films they watch here nowadays. Life is not complete without its bitter side, he opines, hence they need to make films to be instruments of positive change in Nigeria.

Alawode (2007) in *Nigerian Environment in the Eye of Nigerian Home Videos*, reveals that the Nigerian homes in the home videos would seem to be the most corrupt over the markets and religious institutions even as they would seem to be more transparent than the police. He explains that the findings show a movement that

could be triangular from home to market to the religious institutions. He further explains that through the eye of the video camera, the Nigerian environment is usually clean and tidy represented by 75% of portrayals in his study. While considering corrupt/dubious and transparent/honest, men tend to be more corrupt than transparent represented by 60.6% to 55.3% cases; women were seen to be more honest/transparent (44.7%) than corrupt/dubious represented by 39.4% cases. Fifty nine point eight percent representing Nigerian men were more likely to be rich, opulent, exotic and elegant than 38% of the women encountered. However, both men and women could have equal chances of being poor.

Theoretical Framework

Folarin (1998) posits that mass communication is a major facet of human communication. The delivery system of communication permits the flow of information to large, diverse, and scattered audiences, which may also be far removed from the source. Home video is identified as a medium or form of human communication which aptly fits into this definition. While citing Severin and Tankard (1992 & 2001) as he explains mass communication as an object of study, he presents three aspects of understanding Mass Communication—(1) as an art; (2) as a skill; and (3) as a science. Home video is a representation of all the aspects identified by the scholars because following his explanation: as an art, the process of making home video tasks the (professional) communicator's creative abilities; as a skill, the filmmakers—producers, scriptwriters, directors, actors, and actresses must need to have mastered some skills like writing, articulation, elocution, phonemics, handling of camera, amongst others, in order to be very effective; as a science, there are underlying principles, theories and researches involved in the process of making films; no film can be effectively made without the knowledge of social and behavioural sciences like sociology, psychology, political science, economics and business administration; information and communication technology, engineering and physics also drive film making. This study was undertaken within the framework of agenda setting and cultivation theories.

Agenda Setting Theory

Following Folarin, agenda setting based on the Agenda setting theory as propounded by McComb and Shaw (1972) asserts that mass media pre-determines what issues are regarded as important at a given time in a given society. The theory does not ascribe to media the power to determine what we actually think but does ascribe to them the power to determine what we are thinking about. He presents the elements involved in the theory as follows:

- (1) quantity or frequency of reporting;
- (2) prominence given to the reports through headline display, pictures, and layout in newspapers, magazines, films, graphics, or timing on radio and television;
- (3) the degree of conflicts generated in report, film, etc.;
- (4) cumulative media-specific effects over time.

According to Honor Communication Quarterly review, the theory is good in explaining why people with similar media exposure place importance to the same issues. Although people may feel differently about the issues at hand, most people feel that the same issues are important. According to the review, agenda setting comes from a scientific perspective because it predicts that if people are exposed to the same media, they will place importance to the same issues. Chaffee and Berger's (1997) position has that it explains why most people prioritize the same issues as important. His examples of Simpson O. J. and Clinton's scandals give credence as

cases of agenda setting in actions. During the historic events, the media was ever-present. The placement of full page colour, colour articles, and top news programming made it clear that Americans should take the events as important issues. Some people believed Simpson was guilty while others believed he was innocent. Some believed Clinton should be impeached yet others thought otherwise. The media was not extremely successful in telling people what to think on the issues but most Americans believe the events were important issues for a very long period of time.

The study is therefore considered within this framework because the home video producers as well as promoters of its offerings on the television screen consider that its viewing audience should give thoughts to the portrayals, representations and to the overall offerings of the medium, amongst many other objectives. It is natural for the viewing audience who learns certain things from the medium to attempt to experiment practice and/or adopt same.

Cultivation Theory

According to Demers, Saliven, et al (2001) cultivation theory originally propounded by George Gerbner and expanded by Gerbner and Gross (1976) says that TV has been the main source of storytelling in today's society. The theorists classifies those who watch for four or more hours a day as heavy viewers and those who watch for less hours as light viewers. They assert that heavy viewers are exposed to more violence and are therefore affected by the mean world syndrome which sees the world as worse than it actually is to them; subsequently, the overuse of TV is creating a homogenous and fearful populace. Derived from the University of Twente review of the theory, the core assumptions and statement of the theory include the following:

- (1) Television is responsible for shaping and cultivating viewers' conception of reality;
- (2) Television tends to cultivate middle of the road political perspective which effects Gerbner called "mainstreaming";
- (3) Resonance describes the intensified effects on the audience when what people see on TV is what they have experienced in life.

According to the reviewer, the theory usually involves the correlation of data from content analysis (identifying prevailing images on TV) with survey data from audience research (to assess any influence of such images on the attitudes of viewers).

Method

Content analysis was the research method used to identify the portrayals and representations that reveal the Nigerian image in the home video films. It was a systematic process where the researchers purposefully selected, watched, and analyzed 50 home video films of English production. Only the films televised on the Nigerian television stations in Lagos and Africa Magic (a cable network station) were considered. Coding categories were developed from variables like: language, storylines/themes, lifestyle, foods, gender, beliefs/norms/values, attitudes to other people, natural environment and nature of relaxation/recreation. One hundred and sixty subjects/cases were recorded through the exercise. Data analysis was done quantitatively.

Results and Discussion

Portrayals and representations in the home videos revealed the image of Nigeria to different categories of people: to the young and old, men and women, to Nigerians living in the country and those in Diaspora as well

as to foreigners alike. Investors have understood opportunities in the country through the video films; researchers have obtained knowledge, information and data from it; tourists and travelers from other countries have attempted to know and understand Nigeria through the film offerings; even the journalists use the home videos to make a living. The home video is also relevant to the government of Nigeria and policy makers who desire to enhance the image of the Nigerian nation. The video makers have in different ways attempted to project and promote the nation's image to its viewing audience all over the world. Those films are watched unhindered through different kinds of devices including YouTube, digital satellite services, from television stations amongst others. With the films released into the market after production, the producers, and regulators and government would not be able to withdraw them from being viewed by the audience in event that they are unsatisfied with the portrayals.

The films analyzed were epic, comedy and represented as 2%, 4% and 94% respectively; urban, urban-slum and rural settings were revealed in 69.4%, 28.1%, and 2.5% cases respectively. Buildings as duplexes/mansions have 22.5% representation, 11.3% cases were skyscrapers and bungalows respectively, 8.8% were office complexes and shopping complexes respectively, 5% were clay/mud/thatched houses, 1.9% represented stadium while 1.5% had no building.

Table 1

Types of Building/Appearance

Buildings	Masterpiece/ elegant	Beautiful	Normal/ordinary ordinary	Dilapidated	Ugly/shabby/unhygienic unhygienic	No building	Total
Duplex/mansion	25 (15.7%)	11 (6.9%)					36 (22.5%)
Skyscraper			18 (11.3%)				18 (11.3%)
Storey building		25 (15.7%)	18 (11.3%)				43 (26.9%)
Mud/thatched/clay			3 (1.9%)		2 (1.3%)		5 (3.1%)
Office complex		10 (6.3%)	4 (2.5%)				14 (8.8%)
Shopping complex		2 (1.3%)	12 (7.5%)				14 (8.8%)
Stadium			3 (1.9%)				3 (1.9%)
Indescribable				3 (1.9%)		24 (15%)	27 (16.9%)
Total	25 (15.7%)	48 (30%)	58 (36.3%)	3 (1.9%)	2 (1.3%)	24 (15%)	160 (100%)

Note. Source: Sunday, Uduakobong (2012).

Table 1 shows types and appearance of the buildings as follows: Fifteen point seven percent were masterpiece/elegant and 6.9% were beautiful. The storey buildings were either beautiful or normal/ordinary represented by 15.7% and 11.3% respectively. Skyscrapers represented by 11.3% were all normal/ordinary; 6.3% of the office complexes were beautiful while 2.5% were normal/ordinary. The shopping complexes represented by 1.3% and 7.5% were beautiful and normal/ordinary respectively. One point nine percent of the buildings which represented mud/thatched/ clay were normal/ordinary while 1.3% were ugly, shabby and unhygienic. One point nine percent of the contents were dilapidated buildings.

Table 2

People and Their Appearance

People	Flamboyant	Exotic	Modest	Rich	Poor	Total
Male adults	15 (9.4%)	4 (2.5%)	23 (14.9%)	19 (11.9%)	5 (3.1%)	66 (41.3%)
Female adults	12 (7.5%)	8 (5%)	20 (12.5%)	15 (9.4%)	5 (3.1%)	60 (37.5%)
Children				7 (4.4%)	3 (1.9%)	10 (6.3%)
Male (group)	5 (3.1%)					5 (3.1%)
female (group)	3 (1.9%)	3 (1.9%)				6 (3.8%)
Mixed (male/female)	3 (1.9%)	4 (2.3%)			2 (1.3%)	9 (5.6%)
Mixed (male/female/ children)				2(1.3%)	2 (1.3%)	4 (2.5%)
Total	38 (23.8%)	19 (11.9%)	43 (26.9%)	43 (26.9%)	17 (10.6%)	160 (100%)

Note. Source: Sunday, Uduakobong (2012).

Table 2 shows that Nigerians portrayed as adults and children (males and females were viewed singly and/or in groups). In the case of children, there was not much difference in appearance between the males and females hence none was created. Nine point four percent of the male adults were flamboyant; 2.5% were exotic, 14.4% were modest while 11.9% were rich and 3.1% were poor. The female characters were 7.5% flamboyant, 5% exotic, 12.5% modest, 9.4% rich and 3.1% poor. Contents with children were only 10 constituting 4.4% rich, 1.9% poor. Male in groups were seen as flamboyant in 3.1% settings and women were portrayed as flamboyant and exotic in 1.9% cases respectively. In groups of men and women shown together, they were seen as flamboyant in 1.9% settings, exotic in 2.3%, and poor in 1.3% cases. Combinations of adults (male and female) with children were portrayed in 1.3% settings as rich and poor respectively.

Nigerians in social classes were portrayed with 36.6% representing the affluent, 12.5% representing the poor and middle class; the natives were 10%, traditional class/council were 9.4% while people at the lower level and political class had 8.1% depictions respectively and 3.1% constituted a combination of different classes of people.

Nigerians in the films are represented with different kinds of attitudes including 10% as dependent and domineering respectively, 8.8% as cruel/hostile/violent/hateful/spiteful, agile/active and friendly/loving/harmonious/courteous respectively. The people were portrayed as discourteous and cooperative/supportive in 8.1% cases respectively; 6.3% were independent while 5.6% were corrupt; 4.9% were honest; 2.5% were uncooperative; and 0.6% were unthankful.

Table 3 reflects the lifestyle of Nigerian people as portrayed in the Nigerian home video films ranging from traditional/indigenous represented in 25.6% of the settings, conservative 19.4%, flirtatious 12.5%, foreign and indecent 9.4% respectively, modest 8.1%, decent 6.9%, cultured 5%, and gay 3.1%. The above table further reveals that Nigerian males dominated the video scene with 48.1% representation over 34.4% female representations. Nigerian people have more showings as individuals rather than groups. Children (1.9%) and mixed/sex groups have minority showing. Largely, it shows that Nigerians are portrayed as

traditional/indigenous people in one out of four cases represented by 25.6%, as conservative in 19.4%, as flirtatious in 12.5% cases, as corrupt/indecent in 10% cases, as foreign in 9.4% cases, as modest in 8% cases, as decent in 6.9% cases, as cultured in 5% cases, and as gay in 3.1% cases.

Table 3

People/Lifestyles

People	Traditional/ indigenous	Foreign	Conservative	Cultured	Decent	Corrupt/ indecent	Flirtatious	Gay	Modest	Total
Male	15 (9.4%)	9 (5.6%)	17 (10.6%)	2 (1.3%)	2 (1.3%)	8 (5%)	13 (8.1%)	5 (3.1%)	6 (3.8%)	77 48.1%
Female	12 (7.5%)	6 (3.8%)	14 (8.8%)	2 (1.3%)	3 (1.9%)	4 (2.5%)	7 (4.4%)		7 (4.4%)	55 34.4%
Children				2 (1.3%)		1 (0.6%)				3 (1.9%)
Male (group)	4 (2.5%)			2 (1.3%)	3 (1.9%)	1 (0.6%)				10 (6.3%)
Female (group)	5 (3.1%)				3 (1.9%)					8 (5%)
Mixed - adult (male/female)	5 (3.1%)									5 (3.1%)
Mixed (male/female children)						2 (1.3%)				2 (1.3%)
Total	41 (25.6%)	15 (9.4%)	31 (19.4%)	8 (5%)	11 (6.9%)	16 (10%)	20 (12.5%)	5 (3.1%)	13 (8.1%)	160 (100%)

Note. Source: Sunday, Uduakobong (2012).

Further portrayals of Nigerians by lifestyles were revealed through dressing in 30% cases, languages (10.7%), beliefs (9.4%), food (7.5%), music and fetish practices in 6.3% cases respectively, sexuality (5%), African Traditional Religion and ceremonies (3.1%) respectively, singing and dancing (1.3%) respectively, 16.3% had no representations. In most cases, characters in offices were shown in suits and other formal clothing.

Appearances of natural settings revealed trees/plants in 26.3% cases; seas/rivers/farms were portrayed in 3.8% cases; 1.8% cases revealed hill/mountain; wind/air (1.3%). Sixty-seven point seven percent had no representations. Waterfalls, beaches, caves, resort centres/ historical and monumental centres were not revealed in any of the films studied.

The forms of recreation identified with Nigerians in the video films included the following: in the hotels and clubbing (6.9%), at the beach, partying and outdoor games were respectively revealed in 3.1% cases; in 1.9% respective cases, Nigerians were seen at games and swimming while 1.3% showed the people indoors. Seventy-five point six percent cases had no indications of recreation or any form of relaxation.

Table 4

Story Lines/Themes

Story line/themes	Epic	Comedy	Feature
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Protection of legacy	-	-	2 (1.3%)
Marriage to consolidate business association	-	-	1 (0.6%)
Preference of career over marriage	-	-	1 (0.6%)
Prostitution	-	-	2 (1.3%)
Possession by tricks	-	-	5 (3.1%)
Betrayal of trust	-	-	10 (6.3%)
Plot to kill	-	-	3 (1.9%)
Problem of polygamy	-	1 (0.6%)	2 (1.3%)
Backstabbing	-	-	3 (1.88%)
Rape	-	-	8 (5%)
Challenges of marrying people with different background	-	-	1 (0.6%)
Blackmailing	-	-	5 (3.1%)
Grace to grass	-	-	1 (0.6%)
Love for children	-	-	1 (0.6%)
Reward for past favour	-	-	1 (0.6%)
Teenage pregnancy	-	-	1 (0.6%)
Patriotism	-	-	1 (0.6%)
Suicide	-	-	4 (2.5%)
Forced marriage	-	-	3 (1.9%)
Call for service	-	-	2 (1.3%)
Parent destroying child	-	-	1 (0.6%)
Good prevailing over evil	-	-	2 (1.3%)
Witchcraft	-	-	2 (1.3%)
Dying in place of another person	-	-	1 (0.6%)
Child abuse	-	-	2 (1.3%)
Challenge of childlessness	-	-	1 (0.6%)
Insensitivity of parent	-	-	1 (0.6%)
Submission to God's will	-	-	1 (0.6%)
Slavery	1 (0.6%)	-	1 (0.6%)
Quest for power	1 (0.6%)	-	3 (1.9%)
Woman controlling men	1 (0.6%)	1 (0.6%)	-
Wickedness	1 (0.6%)	-	4(2.5%)
Dehumanization	1 (0.6%)	1 (0.6%)	20 (12.5%)
Nemesis	1 (0.6%)	-	-
Secret & scandals	-	-	2 (1.3%)
Infidelity	-	-	4 (2.5%)
Jealousy & negative competition	-	-	7 (4.4%)
Problems of in-laws	-	-	3 (1.9%)
Cultural beliefs	-	-	4 (2.5%)
Marriage for money	-	1 (0.6%)	4 (2.5%)
Woman marrying wife	-	1 (0.6%)	1 (0.6%)
Caring for the poor/help for the helpless	-	-	9 (5.6%)
Help for the helpless	-	-	
Challenge of unemployment	-	-	2 (1.3%)
Irresponsibility	-	-	2 (1.3%)
Exposition of life's experiences	-	-	3 (1.9%)
Quest for wealth at all cost/ greed	1 (0.6%)	-	10 (6.3%)
Malicious gossip	-	-	4 (2.5%)

Wife controlling husband	-	1 (0.6%)	-
Total	7 (4.4%)	5 (3.1%)	148 (92.5%)

Note. Source: Sunday, Uduakobong (2012).

Table 4 shows the story lines/themes with their respective frequencies and percentage distribution, while also revealing attempts by the film makers to explain situations and circumstances of the Nigerian people. Romantic love was consciously not listed as they were prevalent in all the films, either covertly, obviously, or subtly. Through the storylines and themes, Nigerians are depicted as traditional people with cultures, values, and norms with both their positive and negative attributes.

The Reality of Nigerian Image in the Home Videos

The home video makers have done a lot to project the religious practices, beliefs, norms and values of the Nigerian people in the films. Christianity and African Traditional Religion (ATR) had the highest representations in the films analyzed. Every kind of religious practice including Islam, occultism/cultism, spiritism, ATR, and different shades and structures of Christianity would always be revealed in the home videos. People would often seek solutions to problems under the cover of religion. Despite people's level of sophistication and foreign lifestyle, Nigerians can choose to settle matters through traditional means. This is reflected in *Evil Finger* (2005) as the daughter of a man who was defrauded and killed by his brother-in-law (running his business) goes to meet the elders in their family to summon the suspect to absorb himself of all accusations leveled against him. The native doctor was able to cause the culprit to go to the village to answer the charges. Not very many home videos are shown without actual portrayals or subtle suggestions of witchcraft and fetish practices.

Nigerian indigenous cultures are reflected through the home videos. The film—*The Plain Truth* (n.d.) reveals a culture which a woman who is unable to give birth to children marries another woman to bear children in her name. In this case, the young wife and her family are deceived to believe that she is being married for the woman's son who lives abroad. The woman-husband's brother-in-law would go to sleep with the young wife at night, when she would have been drugged. The home video film, *Stronger Than Pain* (n.d.) is purely traditional in every sense. With Igbo background as setting, almost everything—from props to costumes is traditional. The film gives expression of a typical traditional society; all the cooking and eating instruments are traditional. The drinks—palm wine, manner of cooking, water pots, settings and lifestyles truly depict a typical Nigerian native village. In almost all the home videos with traditional settings, the maidens would always be shown going to/or returning from the streams (through foot paths) with water pots on their heads. The film—*Who will tell the President* (2001), seems to portray almost every aspect of Nigeria—ranging from story line through the lifestyle of the people to geographical landmarks (including natural structures—like caves, streams, rocks, forest, and farmlands). It is also the first and only Nigerian film watched for analysis which gives expression of activities in the air space. In most cases when people are shown eating in home videos, they usually eat jollof rice or white rice and stew. Only in few cases do we see melon soup and garri and sometimes pepper soup as in *Super Story—Sister Sister* and *Stronger Than Pain* (2008). Politicians, traditional title holders (people addressed as “chief”) and some wealthy men were also often shown in traditional wears like “agbada”. Children are usually depicted as respectful and courteous. It can be assumed that Nigerians are groomed to be courteous from childhood, as a young boy is seen opening a door and

allowing his sister to enter first before him in *Two Sides of the Coin* (a serial feature film currently running). However, certain forms of dressing seem unrealistic for the intended settings. For example, a village woman wearing lipstick to sleep at night with cutex beautifully polished on her finger and toe nails. This suggests that irrespective of class and settings, Nigerians are very sophisticated. This portrayal is very unrealistic. Certain dressing like men wearing earrings and women wearing clothes which are somewhat revealing are usually seen as distasteful with the intention of introducing values that are not Nigerian to public domain.

Most houses in the urban setting, where the exteriors were portrayed often have gates and gatemen who would open them to allow access. Nigerians are therefore projected as being highly security minded. Generally, the video films show that most Nigerians live in affluence and in urban settings: The low and middle level people live almost as comfortably as the very rich. In the film—*Evil Finger* (2005), it is suggested that anybody can live in any kind of house as desired. This is deduced from seeing that a manager whose salary was N150, 000 per month in 2005 lived in a mansion. In the film, *Two Sides of a Coin*, the house of a rich man's driver looks like that of a middle class person. This conveys the impression that at whatever level, Nigerians can live so comfortably.

Politicians and other position seekers, even outside the shore of Nigeria have used actresses of Nollywood to wield massive support. There are also certain attitudes and lifestyles expressed in the home videos which the viewers have appalled. These are shown through story lines/themes with corruption in high and low places, loose morals, illicit drug trade, witchcraft, and fetish practices, violence, ritualism, and occultism/cultism, amongst others. Without the conscious intentions of the video makers, the portrayals can be subtle suggestions by the film makers on the lifestyles and attitudes to adopt by the viewing audience. This is confirmed by recent studies on ritualism, religion in home video that ritual killing was popularized amongst the youth following their exposure to Kenneth Nnebue's *Living in Bondage* (Okwori, 2003; Uwah, 2008). This position is supported by Soyinka (2012), a medical doctor and pastor, who believes that incessant portrayals of scary stories of witchcraft and ritualism in home videos have instilled fear into the lives of people, especially children. He further insists that exposure to home videos have made people not to trust others as before the popularity of Nollywood films in home videos and African Magic. Unfortunately, portrayals in the home video have increasingly projected the nation in very bad light thereby tarnishing the image of the nation and causing embarrassment to its citizens, especially travelers as well as robbing the nation and its people of profitable opportunities amongst the comity of nations.

From *Sound of Love*, the research reveals that it is possible to find some patriotic Nigerians as a Nigerian houseboy to a foreigner—Francis Duru (Silas) protects Nigerian image from being battered by his bosses (husband and wife), who have been fraudulently dispossessing people of their hard currencies. The house boy is asked to pose as a bank manager when their victims arrive. He agrees but intimates the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) officials, who lay surveillance on the culprits and arrest them. The film is an exceptional positive contribution towards rebranding the Nigerian image.

Findings from literature review and empirical studies have revealed that through the home video, the characters/talents have been seen as image makers and models whose lifestyles, dressing, and language amongst other things other people have sought to emulate. The actors/actresses almost always have good looks and are usually well dressed (except when situations of poverty and lack are being portrayed). People, other than Nigerians, have learnt to adopt the Nigerian ways of speaking and doing things as a result of their interaction with its attitudes, cultures, and values on the home videos.

Conclusion

Portrayals and representations of Nigeria and her people by the video makers have determine how their reputations are known by the viewing audience; the film makers have consistently revealed to the world their impression of how the Nigerian people behave and conduct themselves which has generated commensurable responses and attitudes from other people, especially foreigners; Nigerians are not seen distinct from the image of them created by the video makers; the images depicted through the home videos have largely suggested certain lifestyles, attitudes, values, and norms that may rightly or erroneously be attributed to Nigerians. While the Nigerian socio-economic and political environments can be the deduced from the home videos, prospective contacts, tourists, and investors to Nigeria who may use the home videos to obtain information about the country, its people and environments may be positively or negatively inclined to associate with the nation because of the offerings of the home videos.

Being a medium of communication with indisputable powerful effects, attempts should be made by stakeholders in the home video industry to project Nigeria as a promising tourist, business, and investment destination with people of tolerable lifestyle and attitudes. A realistic portrayal of the Nigerian image should amongst other things convey the essence of Nigeria and its people in the theme/ storyline with a consciousness to project the nation's investment opportunities, recreation centres, tourist centres, and attractions. Portrayals in Nigerian home videos should capture places of excitement like Protea Hotel, Sheraton hotel, Hilton hotels, amongst others. Agricultural produce, natural resources, solid mineral of the nation amongst other things should be promoted amongst other portrayals in the home videos. Nigerian symbols like the flags, currencies, coat of arms should be captured in the films. Monumental and historical structures and definite environmental representation like Zuma rock, Tafewa Balewa Square (race course), Tinubu Square can be captured as montage in the films. The beautiful sceneries of Nigeria in the home videos: waterfalls, games reserves, ranches, and the beaches with the large groves of coconut trees should not be disregarded.

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Distorted Alarms: The Epidemic Narrative and the Media Story—The 2009-10 Swine Flu in the Portuguese News

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In April 2009, a new strain of influenza subtype H1N1 emerged due to the rearrangement of two RNA segments. The strain incorporated two segments of the genome of porcine origin and was officially designated as A/California/4/2009/H1N1. In June 2009, alarmed by the infection's progress, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the "level six" of the geographical progression scale for epidemics and kept it at that level until August of the following year. The Portuguese media activated the public health alarm and integrated it into its agenda, but the volume and severity indicators of the news coverage did not correspond to the epidemiological indicators of progression. This paper describes how two narratives with different rhythms for the swine flu pandemic *de facto* emerged.

Keywords: risk society, expertise, news making, news-values, health risks

On April 24, 2009, after receiving the results of tests performed by a Canadian laboratory, the WHO announced the identification of eight suspected cases of a new flu strain in Mexico and seven in the United States. Since March the North American media divulged frightening evidence of the progression of a lung disease in Mexico, with unidentified causes and similar initial symptoms to those of the seasonal flu.

Although it is difficult to trace the outbreak to the source, it has been argued (Cervantes et al., 2009) that the emergence of three dozen cases of respiratory diseases in the village of La Gloria, in the south-eastern Mexican state of Veracruz and near pig facilities, is the most probable source for the so-called "patient-zero".

The rapid progression of infection in the Mexican territory and the lack of basic knowledge of morbidity and mortality rates of the virus, as well as the risk factors of this particular strain, contributed to the significant alarm within WHO. Although influenza pandemics were not unprecedented—there were at least four in the last 120 years (in 1889, 1918-19, 1957, and 1968, according to Nerlich et al., 2007), the speed of contact between human communities was now a new factor for spreading the contagion. As Ungar (2008) pointed out about the outbreak of Ebola in the Democratic Republic of Congo, though new epidemics can erupt in remote destinations, they are now easily spreadable via a plane trip.

Analyzing the media coverage of the swine flu pandemic in Britain, Harding (2009) concluded that there were several igniter factors likely to alarm the Western media to the severity of this health problem. The account of deaths allegedly caused by the strain in Mexico between March and April 2009 was certainly one of those factors. Early reports revealed more than six dozen deaths, although Mexican laboratories had no technology to effectively track the deaths caused by the virus.

The degree of alarm among WHO and other international health authorities responsible for issuing daily bulletins on updated contagions was a significant indicator of severity, as they clearly conveyed a sense of urgency to the problem.

The profile of the H1N1 virus infection, detected in younger patients, contrary to what generally occurs with the seasonal flu, was also cause for suspicion, particularly because it broke one of the patterns of seasonal flu, multiplying even in the hottest months of the year. Harding (2009) also considered that the alarm rose by 2004-05 avian flu contributed to the construction of a perception that the next epidemic had the potential to be catastrophic, providing a plausible context for a pre-existing frame.

The absence of specialized knowledge and routines in most newsrooms regarding the processes for progression of epidemics should be noted. For many journalists, there were no reliable relationships with the most credible sources in this specialized field of virology, meaning that the fundamental concepts of epidemiology were unknown. As noted a daily newspaper journalist interviewed by the author for this project, many in the media had no frame of reference for the new social problem:

I was unaware of information on the levels of progression and alarm. Although I write a lot about health, I focus more on issues of national health policy. I was not so comfortable with this problem. Incidentally, my own newspaper initially packed up the subject in the international pages, as a problem unfolding in the outside world. (Author's interview with a daily newspaper journalist)

The investment in the subject by an important group of expert sources, with high symbolic power and influence on policy makers (Lopes et al., 2010), as well as their unanimity in acknowledging the threat, also provided encouraging signs for the media to accept the dominant frame and disseminate it in its first reports.

The project was inspired by Murdock's premise (Murdock et al, 2003), according to which the study of journalistic production of risk events requires a complex analysis matrix, not limited to measure the evolution of the journalistic story, but crossing it instead with layers of indicators produced by the expert field.

The Modern Disease

Western societies have evolved in the second half of the 20th century from a paradigm marked by infectious disease to a new model, under which the main cause of death is now chronic or degenerative disease (Lupton; 2003; Cabral et al., 2002). The relationship between society and disease reflects new assumptions to the extent that indicators of health, wellbeing, and life expectancy have seen significant improvements and access to health care has become widespread. Premature death from illness or accident is socially constructed as the breaking of the system, suggesting the need to trace causes and culprits to prevent new instances (Link & Phelan, 1995).

The public debate on health itself reflects this new circumstance, evolving from the complaint of poor health or detection of contagious outbreak conditions, typical of pre-modernity, to discourses on the health system, its strengths and weaknesses, the unequal access to care and, recently, on the signs of system degradation (Lupton, 2003; Silva, 2011). In this paradigm, disease in the media is now built more often in aggressive perspectives, assigning the system user to the need of taking care of his or her welfare (Foucault, 1979). Therefore, a pattern of patient-expected attitudes and health behaviors is created, distinguishing abiding bodies from permissive bodies—those that allow the disease to progress and hence should temporarily abdicate from their own body jurisdiction (Foucault, 1979).

In journalistic representation, many modern diseases bear the stigma of accountability, blaming the patient

for not taking proper care by failing to secure his or her well-being, for being indulgent in food or ingested drugs, for physical inactivity or, in the case of sexually transmitted diseases, for having indulged in promiscuous or risky behaviors (Lupton, 2003).

In this context, strongly emphasized by the media and by a wide range of publications and television programs, a flu epidemic brings back to the public space the paradigm of infectious disease and the spread of disease, regardless of a social agent's behavior. Without known risk factors, the invisible virus circulates without revealing its presence, infecting all ages and social groups alike, and quickly becomes the object of discourse. The prevailing discourse about the flu epidemic constructs the virus as the enemy to be killed. Indeed, news coverage about the pandemic largely followed this frame.

Distortion Between News and the Expert Voices

There is a vast body of literature on the journalistic representation of events marked by strong scientific controversy and without a clear outcome on the horizon (Eldridge et al., 2003; Gonçalves et al., 2007). However, there is no model for media's actions in a scientific controversy, as there are too many variables that affect the final outcome.

In Portugal, Gonçalves (2001) documented how the public debate on the construction of a dam on the River Coa in the 1990's was marked by strong investment in journalistic frames proposed by the proponents of the protection of local rock art sites, affecting the controversy's outcome. However, in an almost identical historical context, the same author (Gonçalves, 2003) noted that the debate over the location of an incineration waste facility was affected by the polarization of scientific advice. In this second case, the two fields in dispute used validated technical and scientific expertise, hence dividing the journalistic intermediation and complicating the debate. In other disputes, such as for instance the discursive battle over an oil spill (Anderson, 2002:8), the media overcomes the ambiguity between sources with a high symbolic capital by building a group as "authorities" (typically, the governmental sources) and the others as "pretenders".

In the world risk society (Beck, 1999), marked by strong uncertainty and frequent emergence of disruptive events that jeopardize the technical-scientific guarantees, conflicts within the scientific field tend to multiply, fragmenting the authority of expertise and posing new challenges to journalistic practice.¹

Project and Methodology

The author argues in this article that health indicators of disease progression, infection, hospital admissions, and deaths can measure the evolution of swine flu pandemics in Portugal between 2009 and 2010. Those are the expert indicators that allowed health officials to estimate the severity of alarm as the epidemic progressed. They constitute what the author called the "epidemiological narrative".

The author further argues that the peak severity of each of these health indicators did not chronologically correspond to the peaks of journalistic activity, inferred from indicators such as the number of stories on the subject or the topic emphasis on newspaper covers or television opening news. These indicators were the journalistic narrative that the author contrasted with the epidemiological one.

The author used official bulletins from the Directorate General of Health (DGH, 2010) about the problem, which contained weekly indicators of infection, hospitalizations, and deaths. In this pandemic, for the first time,

¹ An exception to this may be climate change, where the vast majority of scientific authorities are in agreement, leaving the small community of climate change deniers framed not as "pretenders" but rather as willfully resistant to evidence.

health officials devoted huge resources to the compilation and provision of statistical information, allowing reporters to include validated, reliable information in their stories.

From April to June 2009, information was released daily and all cases of infection were confirmed by laboratory analysis. After the summer, these reports became weekly as health authorities no longer had the capacity to confirm all suspected cases of H1N1 infection. The weekly reports informed the media of flu-like symptoms, e.g., the number of individuals who resorted to health facilities with flu-associated symptoms, and the number of hospital admissions. From September 2009 to January 2010, DGH also included weekly information on deaths associated with swine flu in Portugal. This unprecedented effort standardized media coverage and allowed an a posteriori long-term analysis, enhanced by the first epidemiological assessment of the disease on national territory (Froes et al., 2010).

The first death occurred on September 23, 2009 and the last on March 3, 2010. In Portugal, the first confirmed infection was diagnosed on April 29, in a woman who had travelled to Mexico. The second occurred only on 31 May and the third on June 12. Many others followed until the first secondary case (diagnosis of an infected patient after the first generation of an incubation period), on the 4th of July. Then came the first cluster in a Lisbon kindergarten the next day (generated by initial five cases associated with a child who had been in Mexico). On 10 July, the first case was identified with no epidemiological history (e.g., impossible to determine where and how the contamination occurred). On 18 August, the number of patients with no epidemiological history surpassed for the first time the number of imported cases and secondary cases (DGH, 2010).

In the journalistic narrative, within a broader project (Rosa, 2013), the author selected three primary sources: the print edition of a prestigious daily newspaper (“Público”), the electronic edition of a popular newspaper (“24 Horas”) and the eight o’clock news program of public television (“RTP”). The author screened all the journalistic materials containing the previously defined words (“flu”, “epidemic”, “pandemic”, “virus”) from April 21, 2009, the day of the first story broke out, to the end of April 2010, when DGH stopped its swine flu bulletins.

In the study design, an item was any autonomous newspaper or newscast space, any illustration, textbox or headline, created as an independent unit (Silveira et al., 2010) from these three primary journalism sources. In the newspapers, the author also coded all headlines or verbal titles visually related to the topic, assuming, as Van Dijk (1988) did, that they express “the top of the semantic macrostructure, program(ing) the process of interpretation and provid(ing), a (subjective) definition of the situation” (p. 173).

The author argued that the same role could be attributed to the opening news in the television newscast. Besides the number of daily items produced by each media outlet and the number of headlines devoted to the case, he has also considered as indicators of journalistic relevance the references to swine flu on the first page of the sampled newspapers. This indicator had no equivalent on television.

The purpose of this study was to find clues about the variations between the journalistic and the epidemiological narratives. To this end, the author established significant time landmarks for this event, like the formal declaration of the pandemic (week 24 of 2009); the first death in Portugal (week 39); the death of a 10 years old boy, the most dramatic incident during the coverage (week 44); the week of a false alarm accidentally generated by three foetal deaths in utero of vaccinated pregnant women (week 47); and the week with the most deaths in the country (week 49).

In the project, the author also interviewed two journalists, one from a daily newspaper and the other from

the television information division, and he interviewed two crisis managers for the operative group constituted by the Ministry of Health to stop the pandemic. Accepting Mathison's triangulation of methodologies (Mathison, 1988), the author aimed at reducing the researcher's interference in the analysis, allowing each respondent to account for his or her particular perspective and revealing the unsaid in the news text.

Results

The quantitative indicators of news coverage should be interpreted with caution, but it seems undeniable that the swine flu coverage was high in the sampled media. The author detected 746 items in "Público", 356 in "24 Horas" and 443 in "RTP" (see Table 1). The flu was a cover story on 66 occasions (18 as headline) in the first of these newspapers and in 42 days in the second (with only three headlines). In the newscast, it was the opening story in 30 different occasions and it ranked among the top ten daily news items in 255 days.

Table 1

Items, Headlines, or Television Opening News and First Page References in Both Newspapers

Week	Items	Frequency	Headlines	Frequency	First page	Frequency
17 (20/04-26/04)	11	0.71	2	3.92	1	0.92
18 (27/04-03/05)	109	7.055	5	9.80	8	7.40
19 (04/05-10/05)	90	5.82	2	3.92	10	9.25
20 (11/05-17/05)	18	1.16	0	0	2	1.85
21 (18/05-24/05)	22	1.42	0	0	1	0.92
22 (25/05-31/05)	6	0.38	0	0	0	0
23 (01/06-07/06)	12	0.77	0	0	2	1.85
24 (08/06-14/06)	20	1.29	2	3.92	2	1.85
25 (15/06-21/06)	27	1.74	0	0	1	0.92
26 (22/06-28/06)	10	0.64	1	1.96	0	0
27 (29/06-05/07)	29	1.87	2	3.92	2	1.85
28 (06/07-12/07)	92	5.95	9	17.64	9	8.33
29 (13/07-19/07)	59	3.81	4	7.84	4	3.70
30 (20/07-26/07)	60	3.88	1	1.96	4	3.70
31 (27/07-02/08)	52	3.36	1	1.96	2	1.85
32 (03/08-09/08)	48	3.10	2	3.92	5	4.62
33 (10/08-16/08)	96	6.21	4	7.84	7	6.48
34 (17/08-23/08)	50	3.23	2	3.92	3	2.77
35 (24/08-30/08)	39	2.52	2	3.92	1	0.92
36 (31/08-06/09)	34	2.20	2	3.92	2	1.85
37 (07/09-13/09)	32	2.07	1	1.96	2	1.85
38 (14/09-20/09)	28	1.81	0	0	3	2.77
39 (21/09-27/09)	46	2.97	3	5.88	5	4.62
40 (28/09-04/10)	28	1.81	0	0	1	0.92
41 (05/10-11/10)	22	1.42	0	0	1	0.92
42 (12/10-18/10)	16	1.03	0	0	1	0.92
43 (19/10-25/10)	33	2.13	1	1.96	1	0.92
44 (26/10-01/11)	104	6.73	3	5.88	9	8.33
45 (02/11-08/11)	56	3.62	2	3.92	3	2.77
46 (09/11-15/11)	37	2.39	0	0	1	0.92
47 (16/11-22/11)	77	4.98	0	0	6	5.55

48 (23/11-29/11)	50	3.23	0	0	4	3.70
49 (30/11-06/12)	23	1.48	0	0	1	0.92
50 (07/12-13/12)	18	1.16	0	0	1	0.92
51 (14/12-20/12)	11	0.71	0	0	0	0
52 (21/12-27/12)	11	0.71	0	0	1	0.92
53 (28/12-03/1)	7	0.45	0	0	0	0
1 (4/01-10/01)	11	0.71	0	0	0	0
2 (11/01-17/01)	4	0.25	0	0	0	0
3 (18/01-24/01)	3	0.19	0	0	0	0
4 (25/01-31/01)	17	1.10	0	0	1	0.92
5 (01/02-07/02)	9	0.58	0	0	1	0.92
6 (08/02-14/02)	5	0.32	0	0	0	0
7 (15/02-21/02)	6	0.38	0	0	0	0
8 (22/02-28/02)	2	0.12	0	0	0	0
9 (01/03-07/03)	1	0.06	0	0	0	0
10 (08/03-14/03)	0	0	0	0	0	0
11 (15/03-21/03)	0	0	0	0	0	0
12 (22/03-28/03)	4	0.25	0	0	0	0
13 (29/03-04/04)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Totals	1,545	100%	51	100%	108	100%

Note. Total cumulative percentages were rounded to 100%.

Focusing on the three indicators of journalistic attention, the author found that the first critical period occurred at weeks 18 and 19 of 2009, corresponding to the last week of April and the first of May. This coincided with the public identification of a new health issue quickly seen as alarming, given the information that came from Mexico and WHO. In fact, week 18 saw the biggest volume of journalistic items about swine flu of the entire sample (109). A week later the subject reached the peak of first page coverage on both newspapers (10).

The second peak of journalistic intensity was produced in week 28, a period with the highest number of headlines and television openers (9). The discussion then included the first items of government planning for the acquisition and management of future vaccine against the virus.

A new increment in journalistic production was found in week 33, with a high volume of news items (96) and headlines (4). Journalistic attention was then driven to the capacity of health services in the South of Portugal to deal with the anticipated increase of hospital calls.

A last clear peak in journalistic attention was detected in week 44 (the final week of October). In the ranking of news-production, it was the second highest in published items (104) and first page references (9). By then, flu-related deaths had already begun and the country was shocked with the news of the death of a 10 years-old child after a short hospitalization. Significantly, the same day, another patient died in the Azores. But as he fell within the expected age group of a swine flu victim and since his death took place in a territory outside the main journalistic territorial networks (Tuchman, 1978), the event had slight prominence.

Table 2 refers to the epidemiological narrative and reveals different patterns.

Table 2

Epidemiological Indicators (Lab Confirmed Infections, Flu-like Symptoms, Hospitalizations, and Deaths)

Week	Cases	Frequency	Symptoms	Frequency	Hospitalizations	Frequency	Deaths	Frequency
17 (20/04-26/04)	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
18 (27/04-03/05)	1	0.04	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
19 (04/05-10/05)	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
20 (11/05-17/05)	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
21 (18/05-24/05)	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
22 (25/05-31/05)	1	0.04	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
23 (01/06-07/06)	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
24 (08/06-14/06)	1	0.04	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
25 (15/06-21/06)	3	0.13	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
26 (22/06-28/06)	5	0.22	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
27 (29/06-05/07)	33	1.47	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
28 (06/07-12/07)	53	2.36	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
29 (13/07-19/07)	54	2.40	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
30 (20/07-26/07)	92	4.09	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
31 (27/07-02/08)	88	3.92	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
32 (03/08-09/08)	234	10.42	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
33 (10/08-16/08)	740	32.97	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
34 (17/08-23/08)	950	42.33	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	0
35 (24/08-30/08)	N/A	N/A	2,879	1.49	3	0.20	0	0
36 (31/08-06/09)	N/A	N/A	2,390	1.24	13	0.90	0	0
37 (07/09-13/09)	N/A	N/A	2,105	1.09	19	1.32	0	0
38 (14/09-20/09)	N/A	N/A	2,213	1.15	20	1.39	0	0
39 (21/09-27/09)	N/A	N/A	1,530	0.79	21	1.46	2	1.61
40 (28/09-04/10)	N/A	N/A	1,772	0.92	15	1.04	0	0
41 (05/10-11/10)	N/A	N/A	2,476	1.28	20	1.39	1	0.80
42 (12/10-18/10)	N/A	N/A	3,044	1.58	15	1.04	1	0.80
43 (19/10-25/10)	N/A	N/A	4,732	2.46	47	3.26	0	0
44 (26/10-01/11)	N/A	N/A	7,110	3.69	63	4.38	2	1.61
45 (02/11-08/11)	N/A	N/A	14,111	7.33	121	8.41	1	0.80
46 (09/11-15/11)	N/A	N/A	19,903	10.35	164	11.40	3	2.41
47 (16/11-22/11)	N/A	N/A	27,121	14.10	148	10.29	9	7.25
48 (23/11-29/11)	N/A	N/A	27,169	14.12	149	10.36	8	6.45
49 (30/11-06/12)	N/A	N/A	20,506	10.66	127	8.83	18	14.51
50 (07/12-13/12)	N/A	N/A	14,518	7.54	133	9.24	15	12.09
51 (14/12-20/12)	N/A	N/A	10,221	5.31	95	6.60	13	10.48
52 (21/12-27/12)	N/A	N/A	6,419	3.33	58	4.03	9	7.25
53 (28/12-03/12)	N/A	N/A	4,811	2.50	73	5.07	9	7.25
1 (4/01-10/01)	N/A	N/A	4,558	2.37	39	2.71	10	8.06
2 (11/01-17/01)	N/A	N/A	3,451	1.79	34	2.36	9	7.25
3 (18/01-24/01)	N/A	N/A	2,986	1.55	17	1.18	5	4.03
4 (25/01-31/01)	N/A	N/A	2,517	1.30	22	1.52	3	2.41
5 (01/02-07/02)	N/A	N/A	2,046	1.06	12	0.83	4	3.22
6 (08/02-14/02)	N/A	N/A	1,706	0.88	10	0.69	1	0.80
7 (15/02-21/02)	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0
8 (22/02-28/02)	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	1	0.80
9 (01/03-07/03)	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0

10 (08/03-14/03)	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0
11 (15/03-21/03)	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0
12 (22/03-28/03)	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0
13 (29/03-04/04)	N/A	N/A	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	0
Totals	2,244	100%	192,294	100%	1,438	100%	124	100%

Note. Total cumulative percentages were rounded to 100%. Source: Clinical Bulletin of the DGH (2009/10); Froes et al., (2010).

Of the four selected indicators (confirmed infections, flu-like symptoms, hospital admissions, and deaths), it is worth noting that the timeframe of the first one was quite different from the others, since this clinical procedure was only recorded up to week 34. The data demonstrates that the epidemiological problem significantly worsened from week 32, during which the contagion always exceeded 200 people per week. The following week, the contagion almost tripled and reached its highest value at week 34, which corresponded to 42% of all swine flu cases reported since April.

Remaining indicators reveal a more uniform peak severity. It becomes evident that the flu-like symptoms and the corresponding hospital admissions worsened significantly from week 46 and continued until the end of November 2009. The peaks occurred in week 48 (flu like symptoms) and 46 (admissions). From mid-November, the deaths also increased steadily, albeit with a slight lag compared to previous indicators. The most severe weeks, with more than ten deaths per week, were weeks 49, 50, and 51 of 2009 and the first week of 2010.

The overlapping of these data layers (see Figure 1) suggests that the clinical and journalistic narratives did not chronologically correspond because the media seemed to have reached the *kairos* moment (Rebelo, 2006) or saturation point by the end of November. Yet, this was three weeks prior to the epidemic's actual peak.

As Ramonet (1999: 37-45) had already foreseen for other events, television reached it more quickly than the print media, forcing the remaining medium to define themselves in relation to their agenda. Thus, from week 48 on, the television information service did not again produce more than 50 weekly journalistic items about the flu.

Discussion

It seems clear that the first peak of journalistic activity coincided with the boost provided by validated, reliable scientific sources with high symbolic capital, such as the WHO, the DGH, and the Ministry of Health. Journalists attributed relevance and alarm to the stress signals provided by these official sources, amplifying the risk, its threats and highlighting preventive care. It should be noted, as it has been stressed by the author's interviews (Rosa, 2013), that strong unanimity among international media was also a motivating factor. Finally, the unusual frequency of health bulletins (daily until June) and the use of the minister as a spokeswoman in these sessions, regularly scheduled for the afternoon of each day, also functioned as signals of newsworthiness.

Reporters confided that, by early summer, they already felt that the topic was not progressing as feared. Nevertheless, the journalistic narrative still stressed the responsiveness of health units, companies, and schools to face the expected surge of sick people. By July, however, despite the first harmless cases of confirmed infection, the original frame was still predominant, though fed with complementary frames. As Conrad (2001) had found about the representation of mental illness in the media, despite relevant data to the contrary, news organizations often persisted with their original frames. In this case, journalists continued to present the flu as progressing according to early predictions.




Figure 1. Co-relation of journalistic production indicators to deaths due to swine flu and other crisis milestones.

I remember that in the summer of 2009, I already felt that we were giving too much emphasis on the subject, but I was pressed by publishers to continue to explore new angles to the story. I was told that the policymakers are the experts. They have access to first hand information. I remember talking to a pulmonologist on the reduced impact of swine flu and he quickly rebut it, noting that the seasonal flu kills mainly elderly, but this was different. And the impact and social alarm caused by the death of a young person in his early twenties, marks a different context. It shocks us more. (Author's interview with a daily newspaper journalist)

Health officials complained of the high expectations and drama of journalistic stories in the early weeks of the event. The focus in the worst scenario, when there were several on the table², and the obsession with counting infected patients and updating the rankings produced general high expectations of a serious health problem. When this did not happen, the media demobilized, fuelling the perception that preventive measures had been a false alarm and a waste of resources. In fact, it is likely that the epidemiological point (the curve progression of contagion) had been delayed by the very containment measures—a triumph of public health management. The quotes below show this, though most journalistic accounts of the flu do not.

We delayed the epidemic process compared with other countries precisely because we treated each patient individually and because we had prepared people and institutions. We traced chains of transmission up to two thousand cases at the end of August. This is remarkable. The network of health care worked well and it was ready for a worse situation. Hospitals put into practice measures of isolation very effectively when no one knew what was coming. We acted in an uncertain scenario and we succeeded. (Author's interview with the Director-General of Health)

In a health problem strongly affected by uncertainty, we plan for the worst and expect the best. It cannot be otherwise. No one prepares for an earthquake of level one on the Richter scale. A contingency plan is not worth making for such an incidence. We prepare for various scenarios, always recognize that medicine is not an exact science like mathematics. The medicine is practiced according to the evidence available in each moment, because it is not a science based on You Tube. And the evidence told us that this year's flu virus was predictably unpredictable. (Author's interview with a pulmonologist)

Journalistic interest quickly faded by December 2009 and the first weeks of 2010. Health professionals believe that the dismissal was caused by the saturation of the swine flu's task force, deployed for seven months in a row, and by the interruption of standardized information production to the media. By this point, journalistic expectations for a worst-case scenario had not materialized, leaving some journalists feeling vaguely disappointed that the flu was no longer a lead story.

In the journalistic field, the perception is necessarily different. The incentive of main health sources disappeared, discretely signaling the decrease of government interest in dealing with the topic. At the same time, in early 2010, the first international news emerged, associating the pandemic's management to economic interests in the purchase of vaccines.

The television journalist the author has interviewed suggests a final factor. She recalls that, by January, for the first time the swine flu death toll provided by the Ministry of Health did not match the balance sheets newsrooms were keeping. This suggested to some journalists that the statistics behind the pandemic were subject to manipulation, fuelling stories on false alarms and hysteria. In fact, statistical corrections were being included as new autopsies were processed and subsequently associated further deaths to the virus.

² Several scenarios were previewed in May 2009. The worst possible situation would have been the contamination of two to three million people in Portugal, with a presumed death-toll of around 150,000 people, had the H1N1 virus matched the 2004-05 avian flu virus mortality rate. Milder scenarios were also contemplated but they seldom reached the media.

It seems clear then that the epidemiological and journalistic narratives were processed at different rates. The journalistic storyline consumed complementary frames for several months, strengthening the construction of flu as a severe health alarm. During the summer of 2009, the media debate was around the degree of preparation of social institutions like schools, courts, businesses, and others. Eventually, the saturation point came—the moment when the majority of mainstream media deemed the threat as an unnecessary alarm. This narrative took place with several fast spikes and an acute demobilization from November on.

The epidemiological narrative was gradually built, following the evolution of the indicators of the epidemic. As with the seasonal influenza, the infection slowly rose as the health services concentrated on slowing the advance with prophylactic care. By August, containment measures became useless. The infection quickly progressed and caused deaths and critical situations. From November 2009 to March 2010, the health alarm was at its worst, consuming most of the ministry's resources. Yet, the media had largely ceased coverage of the H1N1 virus in December 2009, fully three months before the end of the worst part of the health alarm.

Conclusion

The risk society produces frightening alarms on all systems managed by security protocols. The globalization of information tends to make such events appear more frequently in the media agenda than they did prior to the global age (Beck, 1992). There is a natural space for rebuttal of expert voices in any democratic regime, because science does not have the monopoly of knowledge, but rather develops as new data challenge prevailing wisdom (Kuhn, 1962). Scientific assumptions thus have a transient nature and must be accepted on conditional authority; they are right until they are proven wrong (Kuhn, 1962). With all its shortcomings, however, scientific expertise is the cornerstone of the industrial-technological system of modern society and its desecration, or even its systematic questioning, generates new anxieties (Giddens, 1991).

In a public health alarm, there are contingency plans prepared to manage the threat, define scenarios and communicate with the public. According to WHO, in an emergency, the pillars of crisis communication are the early announcement of epidemic potential, the information transparency, the accuracy in public reports, the recognition of uncertainty areas, and the public involvement in the process (Lima et al., 2009).

The results suggest the need for broad reflection on the role of media in a health alarm. Journalism outlets are not limited to information diffusion. They apply filters, frames, and production constraints and integrate them into a larger process, which relies heavily on subjectivity of the social leadership structure.

As discussed here, this transformer filter may have little relevance to the needs of crisis management and prioritization of information from the expertise point of view. It is not mandatory, or even desirable, that the journalistic narrative reflects the priorities and epidemiological narrative of a health alarm, like a mirror. There is a space for healthy competition and contestation of the primary frames. But crisis managers need to reflect on the motivations that lead to journalistic narratives so drastically different and distinct from the epidemiological one. People also need to ask whether the public will come out more enlightened with this process.

The journalistic story proved to be more influenced by the production of pseudo-events, minor occurrences involving celebrities or staged occurrences, than by signals emitted by the crisis managers at the later alarm levels of the epidemic. This discrepancy should arouse reflection on newsrooms and on public health managers in an effort to decrease the gap between the two sides when the next alarm arrives. Patterson's solution of knowledge-based journalism (Patterson, 2013), opposed to breaking-news journalism, can present a wealthy starting point for a discussion on reporting under the gun.

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Mobility in the Retirement Period—An Assessment of the Current Situation

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Today, individuals' attitudes towards retirement and old age have changed with the increase of life expectancy and healthy and active years after retirement, rise in purchasing power, and mobility opportunities. As a result of this change, the rate of post-retirement migration, settling into a new life in a new region after retirement, has considerably increased. However, despite of this increase, post-retirement migration is one of the least analyzed migration movements among existing studies. Hence, in this article, studies analyzing properties of post-retirement migration and factors causing this migration are assessed. As every migration movement, post-migration movements also create changes laying different responsibilities on both emigrant and immigrant regions and migrating person and require settling into a new life in the place of arrival. In the relevant studies, the basic reason for post-retirement migration is considered as pursuit of peace and joy and it is defined as a migration type under the high influence of counter-urbanization movement. According to the results of the study, it is stated that post-retirement migrants, unlike many international migrants, can buy their own houses in the countries of arrival and can maintain a relatively high standard of living compared to that local community, and that this situation is a very attractive factor encouraging them to migrate. Moreover in the studies, characteristics causing migration and belonging to the region of departure are analyzed as aversive while characteristics belonging to the region of arrival are analyzed as attractive factors.

Keywords: aging, post-retirement migration, international retirement migration, mobility

Introduction

It has been observed that there is considerable growth in the elderly populations of the world's developed nations. In recent years, increasing human life span, rising economic welfare, convenient and cheap means of transportation have led to the emergence of a new phenomenon among the elderly population, international retirement migration (Haas et al., 2006). International retirement migration, people settling into new lives in a new country after leaving behind their work lives, is a direct reflection of the change in their approach to retirement. This change in attitudes toward old age and retirement and its effects on people's decision processes have led to the emergence of international retirement migration. As a result of influences created by this change, retirement migration, especially international retirement migration, has increased in Europe and America since the 1960s, and more recently, in Asia (Özerim, 2008).

Although migration, at first sight, seems to be a simple geographical change of location, its causes and

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effects create a considerable change in individuals and in society (Çetin & Turhan, 2008). Since the 1960s migration has been, fundamentally, a flow of populations from developing to developed nations. Classical migration theories, given this context, have been generally interested in South-North and East-West migrations and have focused mainly on the movement of labor. The primary concern of international migration studies is to seek an answer to the question of why people migrate. A considerable amount of migration theories explain migration decision and process with economic factors. Approaches that discuss migration in terms of economy equate the migrant population with the labor force. So here the international circulation of the labor force is analyzed as a factor of production (Özerim, 2008). However, the largest population movements of retirees in the last 20 years have been southward, from Canada and the Northern United States to Mexico and Florida. Moreover, a great deal of retirement migration flows from Northern European nations with developed economies, such as Britain, Germany, and Norway, to less developed Southern European countries, which have more favorable living conditions due to their lower living expenses and moderate climates (Turan & Karakaya, 2005).

In addition to the theories that base their explanation of migration on economics, there are also theories based on social parameters. Lee's (1966) approach based on push and pull factors is one of the social theories of migration that is frequently cited. Negative elements associated with the area of origin and encouraging migration are considered push factors, while positive elements associated with the destination are attractive factors, or pull factors (Lee 1966). Among studies on retirement migration in the scope of social theories, the approach using push and pull factors identifies the most important reasons motivating individuals to migrate as climate, environmental conditions and costs of living (Rogers, 1988; Longino, Charles, Perzynski, & Stoller, 2002; Özerim, 2008). The migration of older individuals for the purposes of making their life activities easy and using their personal resources in the best way so as to live comfortably is described using the term "amenity retirement migration" in some studies. The concept of amenity retirement involves individuals' maintaining their quality of life, making the best use of leisure time, attaining and maintaining the highest level of life satisfaction in their retirement. It is argued that "amenity retirement" is an important factor in the decision to migrate after retiring (Longino, Charles, Perzynski, & Stoller, 2002). The "Baby Boomer generation," which describes those born during the considerable rise in the American birth rate during the period from the end of the Second World War until the early 1960s, have migrated in a way that exemplifies the concept of amenity retirement, since they retire early and have relatively higher incomes (Longino, Charles, Perzynski, & Stoller, 2002).

The migration of retired people has special significance, although it constitutes a small portion of population movement at large. It is claimed that individuals who migrate after retirement are more educated, have higher incomes and more active lives than those who do not migrate (Rex, 2002). Older people may choose popular retirement locations where they have previous vacation experiences as their post-retirement migration destination. A history of constant vacationing in an area may also encourage retired people to move to that area since they have built friendship networks and feel happy and peaceful there (Rex, 2002). In particular, a cold climate in their home location may push individuals toward warm regions in the post-retirement period. Retirees migrating from Canada to Florida constitute a crucial example in respect. Having established a social retirement network, Canadian older people individuals influence each other, and the chain of migration emerges, creating clusters of migrants (Carlson, 1998; Stoller, Longino, & Charles, 2001; Longino, Charles, Perzynski, & Stoller, 2002; Mchough, 2003).

Literature Review

So far studies of the migration of older people have generally assessed the situations of retired individuals living in various areas of Europe and America and the motives that push them to migration and their adaptation to their destinations. The positive and negative aspects of migration in long-distance migrations and the socioeconomic situations of short-distance migrations are analyzed in this research.

Rogers (1988) argues that, although the phenomenon of migration is observed among a variety of age groups, it is very frequently encountered among retired individuals, and he focuses on the older population migration models observed in many developed countries (Litwak & Longino, 1987). In research models of retiree migration, the migration age is considered to be 65 years for men and 60-62 for women. Women migrate more often than men. It is maintained that this derives from the high rate of widowhood among women of this age and the fact that it is relatively more difficult for them to be alone than it is for men (Silverstein & Zablotzky, 1996).

Silverstein and Zablotzky's study (1996) shows how migration influences the social lives and health of individuals. This study uses the developmental migration paradigm developed by Litwak and Longino in 1987 as a framework for social determinants. According to this paradigm, the course of retired life is conceptualized as a series of three sequential stages. The first stage occurs after retiring from a healthy occupational life when the individual may choose to relocate to warm climate areas where they can participate in leisure activities. In the second stage, physical or mental frailty, often in conjunction with widowhood, motivates the older person to move closer to an informal care provider or an adult child. In the third stage, individuals with severe disability and in need of nursing may migrate in order to receive professional care. This research analyzed individuals' health and social characteristics and their influence on migration trends in order to provide support services to retired people. The research's results suggest that the expectation of a healthy life is more influential than social factors in retirees' decisions about migration. Thus it is claimed that a more suitable environment, more comfortable physical conditions, and proximity to health services would encourage individuals to migrate. The study conducted by Patrick (1980) also points to the dual role played by poor health, both as a motivator and inhibitor of migration. As social determinants of retirement migration, individuals' daily life choices, their children's situations and their incomes are analyzed. In particular, individuals who have lost their spouses may prefer to live alone or with their children. Therefore, the situations of adult children, especially those who are married and have children, may influence the migration decisions of older individuals as well. Individuals with low incomes are less inclined to migrate than those with high incomes.

Carlson et al. (1998) analyzed motives for the migration of retirees who migrated from various states to Idaho after retiring, using the concept of "amenity retirement". This concept, defined as individuals' arrangement of their daily lives in a manner that maintains their quality of life and the highest levels of life satisfaction after retiring, has been identified as one of the factors that lead individuals to migrate. Population densities and crime rates, employment opportunities, amenity opportunities, better quality of life, geographical proximity to family members, life cycle changes, preferred lifestyle, marital status, and health reasons are also factors that encourage retirement migration. For older individuals who are not satisfied with their place of residence, do not like the area where they live and seek a more suitable home because of old age, migration is an ideal option. The state discussed by this study, Idaho, is a preferred destination thanks to residential buildings that are optimally suited to older individuals. After the decision to migrate and the actual move are made, the next step involves adapting to a new community, and striving to develop ties in order to feel a sense

of belonging. Participation in a variety of community activities is a strong indicator of community ties. For this reason retired people participate in various organizations and social events, volunteer work, and political activities in their destination.

Gustafson (2002) examines the migration of Swedish retirees to Spain in the summer and the factors behind this migration. This study also analyzes the relationships of Swedish retirees with the local population in Spain, the changes in their daily lives, and their social adaptation. The reasons for the study's selection of Swedish retirees are Sweden's European Union membership; hence their easy entry into Spain without a visa, their economic wellbeing, high standard of living, and their desire to vacation in warm areas since Sweden is in Northern Europe. According to results obtained from face to face interviews with 46 participants between the ages of 55 to 88, contrary to the perception of local Spanish community, these people do not regard themselves as tourists. However, Swedish retirees say that the local community treats them as foreigners due to the differences in their appearances (light skin, different eye color, and blond hair). They feel annoyed about the attitudes of the local population who identify them as tourists even though they spend almost six months of the year in Spain. The respondents argue that there are crucial differences between themselves and tourists. The most important one is the fact that since tourists have limited time they return before they could enjoy the region and discover its beauties, whereas they have a long time to discover the "real" Spain. Moreover, they point out that there are many areas that should be seen that are not considered touristic. Those interviewed own their own homes in Spain.

The most striking result of the study is that in the touristic areas that interest Swedish retirees most (Costa del Sol, the Costa Blanca coastal regions, the Canary Islands), the infrastructure has been changed to benefit Swedish immigrants. In these areas, Scandinavian clubs and associations flourish and provide a wide range of activities for the retired residents. Newspapers and magazines from Sweden are widespread. Swedish radio and television broadcasts transmitted via satellite are widely accessible. In mainland Spain, companies owned by Swedes or with Swedish-speaking personnel provide a large number of goods and all kinds of services to the expatriates. Another striking point in this research is that the Spanish state and population have not tried to integrate Swedish retired migrants. For integration is not a personal choice, but an obligation; and it is considered a decision that demands considerable effort and skill. However, although they do not choose integration, they do not accept winter residents as part of their group. Swedish retirees are aware that they should conform to the rules of the area to which they migrate. Perhaps the most interesting result of the interviews is the respondents' efforts to adjust to their destination and make the local population accept them as insiders. Participants state that to this end they learn the local language, eat local foods, choose their clothing so they can dress in the same fashion as the local population and strive to modify their daily habits.

Stoller and Longino (2001) investigate the post-migration lives of people aged 60 years or older who moved to Florida after retiring. People who spend six months of the year or less in Florida, the so-called "snowbirds", were not involved in the research. In this research, too, the developmental migration paradigm of Litwak and Longino (1987) was used. The study focuses on the second stage (living in closer proximity to an informal care provider or an adult child due to physical or mental frailty, often in conjunction with widowhood) of the three stages paradigm; and data from the Longitudinal Study of Aging was used. The most striking result of the research is that the vast majority of retirees (93.0 %) who have moved to Florida have also purchased property in Florida. The average number of years they lived in Florida is specified as 15.3%. The mean satisfaction score is 8.7% on a scale of 10%. Of their near relatives, 18.1% of participants have at least one

child living close by, and 19.4% reported at least one sibling, 22.7% at least one other close relative, and 80.6% at least one close friend living nearby. According to the results of the research, individuals' socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, their attachment to their homes, families, and circles of friends influence their decisions to move. The stronger the personal ties in the originating location (close relatives, children, friends), the higher the likelihood of a return move. Interestingly, older people with adequate financial resources are less likely to consider moving back home than those whose financial resources are more limited. The high level of satisfaction with life in Florida, even among individuals who do not own property, is another striking observation from the study.

A study conducted by Cowper et al. (2000) examines the retirement migration of United States military veterans in 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990. Interest in the geographic mobility of veterans began as a health care planning issue. This research uses the three-stage model of migration first applied in the research of Litwak and Longino in 1987 but adapting it for use with veterans. In the first stage of the model, individuals are motivated to migrate by lifestyle choices. Migration may be a suitable option for veterans with adequate financial resources. The second stage is based on the migration of generally older veteran individuals due to illness or disability. The focus here is not on financial situations or amenity retirements, and it reveals a more dispersed migration pattern. While in the model's third stage, on the other hand, the basic motivation for migration is proximity to family members and making as much use as possible of home-delivered services. This is more likely to be a short range move, rather than long distance move. The number of veterans among retired migrants increased substantially after the Second World War. The primary destinations for veterans in 1990 were Florida, Arizona, Texas, and North Carolina. The study emphasizes that these states are not preferred only by veterans, but also by nonveteran retirees.

Özerim's (2008) study analyzes the factors pushing European retirees out of their own countries and leading them to migrate to another country and settle in Dalyan, Turkey. The climate in the homelands of these retired migrants is identified as the most important determinant of their emigration from their country. The warm climate makes it easy for these older people to accomplish their daily activities and hobbies, such as walking or doing physical exercise. Adventure seeking and a desire to settle into a new life come second in the list of pull factors encouraging migration. What is meant by adventure seeking is to start a new life from scratch. Apart from these, immigrant retirees' love for Turkey, their curiosity about the Turkish lifestyle and their dissatisfaction with the social structure and human relations in their own countries are also listed as pull factors for migration. Another study of this issue (Turan & Karayaka, 2005) conducted in Turkey, analyzes the demographics of British citizens who settle in the district of Didim in the province of Ayden after retiring and purchasing a house there, their motives for moving to the town and their economic impact on the region. Among the motivations of individuals who chose Didim are better living conditions, the absence of stress in the environment, the warm attitude of the local community, and sea and sun.

Conclusion

In brief, the most striking elements in the retirement migration studies to date are that individuals retire early, migrate between ages 55 and 69 and that this group is identified as typical amenity retirement migrants. Older individuals in later life, however, may move in order to be closer to their family due to health problems. In particular, older individuals living far from their children move to places closer to their children for this reason. Another influential factor in retirement migration is income level. Retired individuals with high income

levels are more likely to migrate than those with low incomes. Also, women migrate more than men do. This situation, which is especially common among widows, is explained by the fact that women find it more difficult to live alone at that age than men do. Therefore, among the factors that encourage retirement migration, individuals' desires to have a peaceful life, to spend time with their friends, family, and children are of crucial import. The basic factors in the migration of retirees are generally judged to be leisure activities, low living expenses, and the climate of the destination. Areas with warm climates are preferred most. Natural beauty and recreation areas are also effective factors in the selection of a destination. However, proximity to urban centers is another influential factor. The motives of those who want to be close to developed areas are the presence of medical care, cultural facilities, and opportunities for education and volunteering. Yet many retirees do not prefer big cities due to factors such as high crime rates, high costs of living and pollution. Much of the research on migration during the period of retirement focuses on identifying the reasons why older people change their locations. However, it is essential to plan studies that will take a deeper look into individual and social changes brought about by migration during the period of retirement.

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A Lexical Comparative Analysis of the English and Chinese Color Terms in Connotation

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The vocabulary is the most active factor in the language, and the meaning of color words in the vocabulary is abundant. The nature is multicolored, so various nationalities have formed each unique color view in precipitated long-term history, refracting gorgeous national culture. Culture has restrained the meaning of the color words from developing, and the cultural meaning of the color words has refracted out abundant cultural intension again. Because of different cultural issues, cultural tradition, and culture psychology, the cultural connotations of the English and Chinese color words differ greatly, as a result, these particular cultural connotation meanings are cast under different environments by different nationalities. There are a lot of similarities and differences on the meaning between English and Chinese color words. This paper analyzing Chinese and English color terms in the angle of lexicology, is guided by the book *An Introduction to English Lexicology*. After reviewing the research done by some linguists, this paper starts from the definition and origin of color terms, studies the changing and word-formation of color terms, then ends with some researches on the idioms on color terms, which gives a systematically comparison of Chinese and English color terms on their developing progress.

Keywords: color terms, origin, changing, word-formation, idioms

Introduction

As it is known to us all, the world is surrounded by all kinds of colors which make our world beautiful and spectacular. The uprising sun, the blue seas, and the golden wheat, which consists of the great nature, nurture the human beings. There exist a store of color words and they produce a special word group. However, how much do people know about the color words that contribute too much to the life? Today the author is going to research the four tendencies in semantic change of color words in both English and Chinese and makes a comparison between them.

There are many predecessors who have researched in the field, such as ZHAO Qiao-yun who has paid attention to the four sides of associative meaning in color words that are the associative correspondence, the associative overlap, associative conflict, associative shock, and analyze them one by one (Zhao Qiaoyun, 1988). LIU Ling, who has discussed the issue with the centre of reasons that lead to the distinction of associative meaning in English and Chinese, put forward the National Psychology, social custom, politics and so on. All those people above just give a number of examples on color words, but do not have any theory to support. The differences in the research and theirs' are that the different aspects are focused on. a certain number of theories concerned with lexicology have been put forward, including the definition, classification, features, origin and

conventional research of color words, word-formation, four tendencies in semantic change and idioms—Chinese/English color terms.

Definitions of Basic Color Terms

Color words, in whatever languages, are words used for describing the different kinds of things. The physiological response that the color causes as human vision has some characteristics in common research of scientist indicates that, except color blindness, the visual system of mankind from the perspective of physiological aspect is without any difference. Different nationalities have no difference in color aesthesia or in the ability to correctly distinguish colors. The statistics show that there are more than seven million kinds of colors that can be recognized in the nature. However, the color names in the language are very limited because there are only dozens of colors expressed in single-morpheme word. Besides indicating their specific colors, such as red, yellow, white, black, blue, green, grey, pink, brown, purple, orange and so on, they also reflect the different cultural connotations in different languages. A number of color words are expressed by adding modifiers, for instance, crimson, pale red, apple green, azure, coffee color and so on.

Research on Color Terms

Basic Two Views

Three representative scholars in the research of color terms are Berlin, Kay, and Anna, whose researches are creative and productive. Among all the views, one is commonly agreed that different languages share same color terms and the cognition of color terms is one of the basic cognition fields for the human beings. There are different views about the factors that influence the cognition of color terms. Some scholars propose the cultural relativism, which means that specific language culture determine how people divide continuous spectrum, so it is decided by the specific language system. Another opinion is cultural universalism, which contrary to the first one; it insists that there is a common cognition on color terms in all kinds of languages, that color terms exist in all human languages though the numbers are different. Besides, colors are developed in an orderly and progressively way, that is to say, color terms are of different positions. Some color terms are focal colors while others are non-focal colors that are more explicit and easier to recognize.

Prototype Theory

In the mid 1970s, Rosch proposed the “prototype theory” which is based on human being’s experience and the observation of the world. It also applies to color words. It is explained in the example of color words. Firstly, the visual sense of human being makes it possible for the existence of referential prototype. It is found that black and white are existed in every language for their prototypes are dark and light which human eyes are most sensitive to, so the two colors have some common in human feeling. Another prototype is environmental prototype, for example, fire, the sun, the sea, vegetation, sky, earth, day, night, which are familiar environment in life, so people tend to associate color terms with them so they are correspond to red, yellow, blue, green, brown and so on (Rosch, 1973).

Chinese Research on Color Terms

In China, much researches have been done on the color terms. The translation of sound and color words in English by ZHANG Pei-ji (1964) is said to be the first book on the research of color terms in the field of translating and usage. Another book is *The Color Beauty of Language* by LIU Yang-quan (1988), which

introduces the classification and function of color terms in Chinese. All the research provides many reliable facts and guides deeper study of color terms. However, the domestic studies of color terms are analyzed in the aspects of social culture; few of them touch the research of cognition of color terms.

The Classification of Color Terms

Linguists Berlin and Kay (1969), who have studied color words for several years, put forward a theory that there are 11 basic color words (main color words) in the world: black, white, red, yellow, green, blue, brown, purple, pink, orange, and grey.

Color words in a language can also be divided into abstract color words and descriptive color words, though the distinction is blurry in many cases. Abstract color words are words that only refer to a color. In English, white, black, red, yellow, green, blue, brown, and gray are abstract color words. These words also happen to be basic color terms in English as described above, but colors like maroon and magenta are also abstract though they may not be considered “basic color terms” either because they are considered by native speakers to be too rare, too specific, or subordinate hues of more basic colors (red in the case of maroon, or purple in the case of magenta). The status of some color words as abstract or descriptive is debatable. The color “pink” was originally a descriptive color word derived from the name of a flower called a “pink” (see *dianthus*); however, because the word “pink” (flower) has become very rare whereas “pink” (color) has become very common, many native speakers of English use “pink” as an abstract color word alone and furthermore consider it to be one of the basic color terms of English. “Purple” is another example of this shift, as it was originally a word that referred to a dye (see *tyrian purple*).

Features of the Basic Color Terms

Of common use. They are very common in the daily talk. Instead of disappearing, their meanings are amplified and become richer and richer. Many of them extend to a lot of abstract meanings and some of them can be used as nouns or verbs. What is more, more colors terms are proposed by people, such as *haitunyin*, *menghuanlan*, *wenxinhuang* in Chinese.

High-producing. Through combinations between color words or with other words, there come into being many color dimensions. There are many different dimensions by which color varies. For example, hue (shades of red, orange, yellow, green, blue, and violet), saturation (deep vs. pale), and brightness or intensity make up the HSI color space. The adjective “fluorescent” in English refers to moderately high brightness with strong color saturation. Pastel refers to colors with high brightness and low saturation. Some phenomena are due to related optical effects, but may or may not be described separately from the color name. These include gloss (high-gloss shades are sometimes described as “metallic”; this is also a distinguishing feature of gold and silver), iridescence or goniochromism (angle-dependent color), dichroism (two-color surfaces), and opacity (solid vs. translucent).

Abstraction. Every color term has a lot of meanings, for example, red also has the meaning of pink.

Ambiguity. For colors, there is not a standard. That is to say, people cannot define a specific color terms, take the color blue for example, the dictionary explain that blue is the color likes the color of the sky of a fine day. Two explanations are both unclear and hard to define—what is the kind of grass and sky?

The Origin of Color Terms

If a recent and apparent word which can be clearly defined can change meaning, almost without anyone noticing, perhaps it is not so surprising that other color words have done the same through history. Even the primary colors that you would think too well-grounded in nature suffer much change.

Origin of English Color Terms

Take *yellow* for example. This has been traced to an Indo-European root *ghel* or *gohl* which seems to have denoted both yellow and green. This has evolved into many terms which have reached English by a variety of routes, including *jaundice* (from Latin *galbus* “greenish-yellow”, via French), *gold* (so that “golden-yellow” is a tautology, etymologically speaking), *choleric* (from the Greek word for “bile”, which is yellow-green in color) and *yolk* (which, therefore, just means “the yellow part of the egg”). The word *blue* has had an even more eventful history. It started out, apparently, as the Indo-European root *bhlewos*, meaning “yellow”, and evolved into the Greek *phalos*, “white”, and hence in old English to “pale” and “the color of bruised skin”; people actually re-borrowed the word *blue* in its modern sense from French. However, the word *green* seems always to have been tightly bound to the idea of growing things: Indeed *green* and *grow* come from the same Germanic root. *Red* is another color-fast word, related to the Greek *eruthros* (hence words like *erythrocyte*, “red blood cell”) and to the English words *russet*, *ruby*, *ruddy*, and *rust*.

The Organ of Chinese Color Terms

The origin of Chinese color terms can be traced to the yin and yang, the ancient Chinese view of things, some original meaning of color terms can be figured out through the qualities of the five elements of yin and yang (see Table 1).

Table 1

Five Elements of Yin and Yang

Five	Wood	Fire	Earth	Gold	Water
Colored	Green	Red	Yellow	White	Black
Five parties	East	South	In	Western	North
Five quarters	Spring	Summer	Jixia	Autumn	Winter
Five internal organs	Liver	Heart	Spleen	Lung	Kidney

Wood, which corresponds with green, is representative of kindness and love. Fire, corresponds with red, stands for an irritable temptation. Earth, which corresponds with yellow, means gentle and dependable. When Gold corresponds with white, it means firm and strong. Water, when corresponds with black, it is a representative of wise.

Word-formation

Having outlined the meaning of a word, attention should be turned to word-formation. There are various ways of forming words, but by and large, the various processes can be classified on the basis of frequency of usage into major or minor processes. The major processes are there, namely, compounding, derivation, and conversion. The minor processes are eight, namely, acronym, blending, clipping, words from proper names, back-formation, reduplication, neo-classical formation, and miscellaneous. However, these processes cannot be applied in all words, especially in the color words. Therefore, only processes related to the color words will be

introduced in the following part.

Definition and Introduction of Word-formation

Word-formation, in its restricted sense, refers to the process of how words are formed. Linguists call this phenomenon of specializing inflections and knowledge of rules as the word form learning (morphology), usually referred to as word-building (word formation).

In English, a word must be made up of at least one vowel and one or more consonants, such as *red*, *green*, *black* and so on. This is called *rules*. The rules of word-formation define the scope and methods whereby speakers of a language may create new words; for instance, the *-able* word-formation rules says, “*-able* is to be added to nouns to form an adjective with the sense showing the quality of”. However, not all words which result from the application of the rule are acceptable. For example, *reddable* are not acceptable, even though its formation conforms to the rules of word-formation.

Compounding or Composition

Definition. Compounding or composition is a word-formation process consisting of joining two or more bases to form a new unit, compound word. It is a common device which has been productive at every period of the English language.

Orthographic criterion. Compounds are written in various ways, for example, *red tape* and *red-tape*. However, in Chinese the compounds are made up of two or more single words without hyphens such as *lvdou*.

Phonological criterion. Some linguists regard stress as the best criterion, for example, *blackboard* and *black board*, but Chinese language does not have stresses but four tones. So there is no change in Chinese compound words, especially in the color words.

Examples of compound words. Compounds may be formed from various parts of speeches. Some of the commonest ones consist of noun+noun, adjective+noun, adverb+noun, and noun+-ing form. For example, *snow-white* is an adjective made up of a noun and an adjective; *pale green* is a noun made up of an adjective and a noun; *rosy brown* is a noun made up of two adjectives; *off-white* is a noun made up of a preposition and a noun. *Red-pencil* is a verb made up of two nouns. The Chinese words in the brackets illustrated exactly the same compounds as English words and there are the same changes in Chinese, such as hongri, mohei.

Derivation or Affixation

Definition. Derivation or affixation is generally defined as a word-formation process by which new words are created by adding a prefix, or suffix, or both to the base.

This definition does not consider combining forms, which are also indispensable to derivation. To be more exact, derivation may be defined as a process of forming new words by the addition of a word element, such as a prefix, suffix or combining form to an already existing word.

Prefixation. Prefixation is the formation of new words by adding a prefix or combining form to the base. Prefixes modify the lexical meaning of the base. They do not generally alter the word-class of the base especially in color words. For example, in Chinese the prefixes *light* of the color word *light blue* can be added to other word to express the meaning of light color, such as *light purple*, *light yellow*. However, there is no prefix of color words in English. Take the word *dark green* for example. The word *dark* is added to the color word to form a compound word not a derivation.

Suffixation. Derivation has been operative through the whole course on the history of the English

language. Suffixation is the formation of a new word by adding a suffix or a combining form to the base, and usually changing the word-class of the base. For example, the noun *red*, by the addition of the suffix *-ish*, is changed into the adjective *reddish* and the word *de* is often used in Chinese to express the same meanings. The noun *black*, by the addition of the suffix *-en*, is changed into the verb *blacken* and in Chinese *shi* is used to make it a verb. The noun *green*, by the addition of the suffix *-ly*, is changed into the adverb *greenly* but the word *di* can be found in Chinese with the same meanings.

Conversion

Definition and introduction. Conversion is a word-formation process whereby a word of a certain word-class is shifted into a word of another word-class without the addition of an affix.

It is different from suffixation. It changes the function of the word rather than adds something to it. For example *green* changed into *greenish*, it is called suffixation; and it is called conversion when it is altered from a *noun* to an *adjective*.

Some linguists consider conversion as a rather unsatisfactory term, because it implies that one word has somehow been turned into another, as a result of which the original word will no longer be used. In fact nothing of the sort happens: the original word remains alongside the new one.

Examples of conversion. The word *camel* is a noun and without adding any affixes it can be a adjective, For example, there is a camel in the zoo; I like the camel shoes.

Another example is the word *gold*. We often use it as a noun in *people used gold as currency in old days*. However, it is altered into an *adjective* in this sentence: *the sun shone on her gold hair*.

Other Differences

Some of the word-formation in Chinese color words cannot find the exact ones in English, such as reduplicated words *hongpupu*, *heiqiqi*. And in English the color words are usually used with adverbs to describe a certain degree or they use a new word without the bases of color words to mean the same thing, for example *hongpupu* in English is the word *flushed*.

Four Tendencies in Semantic Change

It is the various colors that make our world beautiful and spectacular. The uprising sun, the blue seas, and the golden wheat, which consist of the great nature, nurture human beings. There exists a store of color words and produces a special of word group. Today we are going to research the four tendencies in semantic change of color words in both English and Chinese and make a comparison between them.

Sense development of English words can be divided into five groups according to the range of their usage and the attitude towards their sense. Change in the denotative component of the lexical meaning may result in the extension of meaning and the narrowing of meaning. Change in the connotative component may bring about the elevation of meaning and the degradation of meaning.

As to the transference of word meaning, it comes into being accompanied with the development of society. Today researches are made about the four tendencies in semantic change with regard to color words. Here they are: extension (generalization), specialization, elevation, degradation and transference of word meaning.

Extension (Generalization)

The definition of extension (generalization). First of all, extension (generalization) means that a word

originally having a specialized meaning now has become generalized. In other words, the word has extended from a narrow sense of a concept to a broader sense of the concept. Extension of meaning is quite common in various languages.

Examples of extension (generalization). In English, the original meaning of white is purity and innocence, but today, it also means something else, for example, the phrase “a white lie” means a harmless and kind lie, and the meaning of “a white coffee” is coffee with milk, a kind of drink. Similarly, in Chinese, there are so many terms involved the word *bai* that have nothing to do with the color “white” such as *baijuan*, *baichi*.

Elevation

The definition of elevation. Secondly, it is elevation of meaning, which means a process in which a word rises from a humble (derogatory) or neutral beginning to a position of commendatory meaning because of social changes.

Examples of elevation. There exist so many instances on color. Black, in both Chinese and English, it generally means dark, improper, insidious and horrible such as “black list”, “black-hearted”, “black art”, “black sheep” and so on. In Chinese, it also represent something bad such as *heishehui*, *heimu*, *beiheiguo*. While in Chinese today, black sometimes means just and impartial. The change emanated from the story of BaoZheng, the equitable and incorruptible official in Song Dynasty. The color of his opera mask is exactly black, therefore people describe the person who is brave to follow the principles and not afraid to pull punches as “playing the devil’s advocate”. However, in English there is not such linguistic phenomenon of black.

Degradation

The definition of degradation. Thirdly is meaning of degradation(deterioration), which is the opposite site of elevation. It means a process in which words’ meanings change from appreciative one to pejorative one.

Examples of degradation. Words, once they are respectable may becomes less respectable because of social changes and social prejudice against certain classes or occupations. The significant demonstration in Chinese is the word “yellow”, which means noble, elegant, and infrangibly for it is the symbolize of imperial power, status, and ruling class; while nowadays it is deteriorated to the synonym of vulgarity, demolition, and decline. For example, some works of literature with filthy and obscene ingredients are called as *huangse* film, *huangse* books, *huangse* software.

Color word in English with the similar meaning of *huangse* is blue, for example, “blue jokes” means scurrilous jokes, “blue software” and so on.

Transference of Word Meaning

The definition of transference of word meaning. Last but not least, transference of word meaning, which is a process in which meaning transfers, occurs between subjective and objective meaning of a word. It refers to the extending in meaning. When a word is used metaphorically, they will produce the meaning of non-literal. The extended one differs from the original one.

Examples of transference of word meaning. This kind of transference is based on the analogue and association of understanding and it is the result of metaphor. For example, in Chinese, *hongyan* and *hongfen*, as it is known to us all, stand for beautiful women and there is no business with the color red. While coincidence, *honggui* and *hongge* represent the boudoir of wealthy girls. In English, “green hand” refers to the person who is new to a job or profession; “green-eye” means someone that is jealous. As to the sentence, “Do you see any

green in my eye?” has the meaning of “Do you think I am too naive to be cheated?”

Idioms—Chinese/English Color Terms

Idioms, with various different formation methods and structure, are the essence of language. An idiom is an element of language that possesses a unique way of expression based on its time-honored use. Generally speaking, the idioms include proverbs, phrases, slang, colloquial expressions, and classic allusion and so on. As for the structure, an idiom is a fixed group of words or a single word, or even a sentence with a special meaning that cannot be guessed from its structure.

The author's research aims at revealing the rhetorical methods on Chinese/English color terms, however, in this aspect; the predecessors did not pay much attention and just focused on its origin, literal meaning, and associative meaning.

Chinese, the highly advanced language, carries a long history thus it holds limitless idioms.

Basic Structure of Chinese Idioms From Rhetorical Method

Rhyme. In the general sense, *general rhyme* can refer to various kinds of phonetic similarity between words and the use of such similar-sounding words in organizing verse. Rhymes in this general sense are classified according to the degree and manner of the phonetic similarity. A rhyme is a repetition of similar sounds in two or more words and is most often used in idioms, poetry, and songs. As is known to all, many Chinese idioms use sound and rhyme to add aesthetic feeling, e.g., red clouds in the east, rain the next day.

Word overlapping. By using this way to describe the expression effect is another character of Chinese idioms. However, word overlapping is not just the simple repeat of words, but it can make the cadence harmonious once used appropriately, which includes rich thoughts and feasts readers' eyes. Meanwhile, it will not loss its artistic beauty. Sometimes, the movements are reflected by the overlapped words to be more real.

For example, in the *Qinghai Lake, the Dream Lake*, the author uses *lanjingjing*, which exactly reflects the shining character of water under the sun. At the same time, *lvinyin* and *huangcancan* are used to highlight the yellow-green grassland, which is colorful and eye-catching. All the phrases can also show the exuberant scene of Qinghai Lake.

Four-character idiom. It may refer to a type of traditional Chinese idiomatic expressions, most of which consist of four characters. Proper using of idiom makes the readers feel formal and thoughtful. *bai yun cang gou* is similar to gray. It refers to the clouds sometimes looking like white robe, however, in the twinkling of an eye, they like the floating dogs. The implicit meaning is all existing things soon to change. *qi zao mo hei* means the farmers work from dawn to dusk all the year round.

The Basic Structure of English Idioms: Figures of Speech

Simile. A simile is a figure of speech that directly compares two different things, usually by employing the words “like”, “as”. Similes indirectly compare the two ideas and allow them to remain distinct in spite of their similarities. It can leave the readers an clear image, and also be vivid. For example, as black as jet, as black as coal, as black as raven.

Metaphor. A metaphor is a literary figure of speech that uses an image, story or tangible thing to represent a less tangible thing or some intangible quality or idea. Metaphor may also be used for many rhetorical figures of speech that achieve their effects via association, comparison, or resemblance, for example,

white elephant—a very costly possession that is worthless to its owner and only causes of trouble.

Metonymy. Metonymy or metronome is a figure of speech used in rhetoric in which a thing or concept is not called by its own name, but by the name of something intimately associated with that thing or concept. The functions of metonymy are to make the expressions euphemistic, implicative, vivid, plain, and clear. For example, grey hairs should be respected (grey hair refers to the elderly).

The Research Purpose

Idioms tend to confuse those who are unfamiliar with them, so students of a new language must learn its idiomatic expressions as vocabulary. Many natural language words have idiomatic origins, but they are assimilated and lose their figurative senses. When a speaker uses an idiom, the listener might mistake its actual meaning for he or she has not heard this figure of speech before. Idioms usually do not translate well; in some cases, when an idiom is translated into another language, either its meaning is changed or it is meaningless.

As for the author's intention, the students should have a better understanding of the idioms so that they can avoid mistakes during the cross-cultural communication and know deeper about culture.

Conclusion

On previous research, many linguistic experts focused on comparison of the associative meaning between the Chinese and English color terms. In their field, they paid much attention to the origin, the associative phenomenon. What is more, they attached great importance to the analysis of reasons from the view of cross-culture and translation aspects. However, in terms of the color terms, it is hardly to be find methodical system.

In this paper, by referring to the predecessors' works, the paper is based upon systematical research as following. In details, it discusses the definitions, basic two views, classifications, features, origin; then the word formation; and then the semantic changes in five tendencies; finally, it studies the rhetorical methods of idioms in the Chinese and English color terms.

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